Hard, soft or situational controls? Bridging the gap between security, compliance and internal control

Abstract

A historic focus on preventing losses from crime and a growing demand for compliance and internal control have placed the risk of employee crime and misconduct high on the corporate risk map. Its potential impact has become increasingly evident and operational management supported by various functional teams are being held accountable for establishing and implementing effective risk mitigating strategies and controls. The need for these teams to work together in a concerted manner is an obvious one, as a lack of alignment may result in inefficiencies and control deficiencies. In this paper it is argued that cross-functional collaboration can potentially be established or improved if practitioners come to realize that the measures and controls developed and introduced to mitigate the risk of employee crime and misconduct are very much alike. Following an exploratory review of the types of controls referred to in literature, it borrows from environmental criminology to demonstrate that similarity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As Wall indicates, ‘43% of the 607 respondents to the 2011 Cyber Security Watch Survey reported that they had experienced an insider incident in the previous year’, and most of the respondents found this type of incidents to be more damaging that outsider attacks (CERT, cited in Wall 2013, p. 107).

  2. 2.

    Quite often, however, the same security measure can be considered both a preventive and a protective measure (IAEA 2008, p. 10).

  3. 3.

    Examples taken from the OECD’s Guidance on Internal Control, Ethics and Compliance (2010), the ICC Rules on Combating Corruption (2011), the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2012) and the U.K. Ministry of Justice’s Guidance on helping commercial organizations prevent bribery (2012).

  4. 4.

    COSO—the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission—is a joint initiative of private sector organizations and is dedicated to providing thought leadership through the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management, internal control and fraud deterrence. For more info, see www.coso.org.

  5. 5.

    Result controls are defined as indirect, preventive-type controls that have the potential to address each of the major categories of control problems; being a lack of direction, motivational problems and personal limitation problems (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007, pp. 8–12, 28). Action controls, as the most direct form of management control, ‘involve taking steps to ensure that employees act in the organization’s best interest by making their actions themselves the focus of control’ (Idem: 76). They include behavioral constraints (i.e. physical or administrative constraints that make it impossible or more difficult for employees to act against the interests of the organization), preaction reviews, action accountability (i.e. holding employees accountable for their actions) and redundancy (Idem: 76–79). Personnel controls, as a third type of controls referred to by Merchant and Van der Stede (Idem: 83), are aimed at clarifying expectations; at ensuring that employees are able, capable and sufficiently equipped to do a good job or at increasing the likelihood that employees will engage in self-monitoring. Cultural controls, finally, are designed to encourage mutual monitoring and to create and shape a strong organizational culture (Idem: 85).

  6. 6.

    As depicted in the so-called ‘integrity triangle’ or ‘fraud triangle’, frauds or integrity breaches are likely to result from a combination of three factors: opportunity, motivation (or pressure) and rationalization (de Kiewit 2011, p. 14; CIMA 2009, p. 13).

  7. 7.

    The model initially included seven factors and was later amended to include eight (Lückerath-Rovers 2011b, p. 79).

  8. 8.

    Please note that some techniques may fit more than one strategy.

  9. 9.

    Situational precipitators are events and influences that can supply or intensify the motivation for individuals to commit crime (Wortley 2008, p. 49). As Wortley points out, the immediate environment can actively encourage criminal responses. It can prompt individuals to commit crime by invoking feelings and desires that would normally not emerge (Wortley, 1997, p. 66; 2008, pp. 51–53). It can exert pressure on individuals to offend, to perform inappropriate behavior, to conform to group norms and standards of behavior, to obey the instructions of authority figures, to comply with requests, and to submerge their identity within the group (Wortley, 2008, pp. 53, 54). It can further help weaken moral prohibitions and permit individuals to engage in normally forbidden behavior (Idem: 55–56), or provoke a criminal or anti-social response by creating a high level of stress in the individual (Idem: 56–58). Finally, by limiting the availability or viability of alternative courses of action, situational precipitators may further interfere with offenders’ abilities to make decisions (Wortley, cited in Thompson and Leclerc 2014, p. 75).

  10. 10.

    Primary soft controls, according to Bode and Schijff (2012, p. 24), are established on an organizational level while secondary soft controls are to be considered the actual control measures that influence culture and behavior on a process level.

  11. 11.

    In an interview for Audit Magazine (see Mulders and Zevenhuizen 2009, p. 6), James Roth refers to soft controls as ‘elements of the corporate culture’.

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Haelterman, H. Hard, soft or situational controls? Bridging the gap between security, compliance and internal control. Secur J (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-019-00208-3

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Keywords

  • Employee crime and misconduct
  • Cross-functional collaboration
  • Hard controls
  • Soft controls
  • Situational measures