A new standard for the evaluation of solidarist institutions

Abstract

Building on Buzan’s suggestion that, when conceived as an analytical tool, the English school’s concept of solidarism simply describes those norms and values that majorities can agree upon, this paper argues – contra most English school solidarists, who tend to be normative theorists – that solidarist institutions have no intrinsic moral value. It is argued that, if the English school’s contribution to normative theorising is to be useful widely, we need a standard for the moral evaluation of solidarist institutions: one that examines their value in instrumental terms. Specifically, this paper suggests that solidarist institutions need to be assessed in terms of their ability to meet basic human needs. This standard for moral evaluation is then applied to the solidarist institutions prevalent at the contemporary core of international society. It is demonstrated that at least the first three of the four solidarist institutions found there – human rights, liberal democracy, environmental responsibility and market capitalism – foster two basic human needs (i.e. autonomy and physical health) and, as such, they are instrumentally valuable.