Abstract
We analyze how pro-market institutions affect firm performance in emerging markets. Integrating transaction costs and signaling theory, we advance three arguments. First, we separate four dynamic components of pro-market institutions: intensifying and fading pro-market reforms and intensifying and fading pro-market reversals. Second, we propose an asymmetric dynamic view whereby not only intensifying reforms but also fading reversals improve firm performance, while not only fading reforms but also intensifying reversals reduce performance. Finally, we argue that more efficient firms perform better under each of the dynamics. We test these arguments on a sample of 1092 firms from 34 emerging markets during 1998–2011.
Résumé
Nous analysons comment les institutions pro-marché influencent la performance des firmes dans les marchés émergents. Intégrant les coûts de transaction et la théorie du signal, nous proposons trois arguments. Premièrement, nous distinguons quatre composantes dynamiques des institutions pro-marché : l’intensification et l’atténuation des réformes pro-marché, et l’intensification et l’atténuation des renversements pro-marché. Deuxièmement, nous proposons une vision dynamique asymétrique selon laquelle non seulement l’intensification des réformes mais aussi l’atténuation des renversements améliorent la performance des firmes, tandis que non seulement l’atténuation des réformes mais aussi l’intensification des renversements réduisent la performance des firmes. Enfin, nous avançons que les firmes les plus efficientes fonctionnent mieux grâce à chacune de ces dynamiques. Nous testons ces arguments sur un échantillon de 1092 firmes de 34 marchés émergents durant la période 1998–2011.
Resumen
Analizamos cómo las instituciones pro-mercado afectan el desempeño de la empresa en los mercados emergentes. Integrando costos de transacción con la teoría de señalización, avanzamos tres argumentos. Primero, separamos cuatro componentes dinámicos de las instituciones pro-mercado: la intensificación y la disminución de reformas pro-mercado, y la intensificación y disminución de las reversiones pro-mercado. Segundo, proponemos una perspectiva de asimetría dinámica en donde no solamente la intensificación de las reformas sino también la disminución de las reversiones reduce el rendimiento, mientras que no solo las disminución de las reformas sino tambien la intensificación de las reversiones reducen los resultados. Finalmente, argumentamos que las empresas más eficientes tienen mejor desempeño bajo cada una de las dinámicas. Hicímos el test de estos argumentos en una muestra de 1092 empresas de 34 mercados emergentes entre 1998 y 2011.
Resumo
Analisamos como as instituições pró-mercado afetam o desempenho das empresas nos mercados emergentes. Integrando custos de transação e teoria de sinalização, propomos três argumentos. Primeiro, separamos quatro componentes dinâmicos de instituições pró-mercado: reformas pró-mercado em ascensão e declínio, e reversões de reformas mercado em ascensão e declínio. Em segundo lugar, propomos uma visão dinâmica assimétrica, em que não apenas reformas que se intensificam, mas também reversões em declínio melhoram o desempenho das empresas, ao mesmo tempo que não apenas as reformas em declínio, mas também a intensificação das reversões reduz o desempenho. Finalmente, argumentamos que as empresas mais eficientes apresentam melhor desempenho em cada uma das dinâmicas. Testamos esses argumentos em uma amostra de 1092 empresas de 34 mercados emergentes durante o período 1998-2011.
摘要
我们分析了亲市场的制度如何影响新兴市场里的公司业绩。 通过整合交易成本和信号理论, 我们提出了三个论点。首先, 我们将亲市场制度的四个动态组成部分分开: 强化和衰弱亲市场改革以及强化和衰弱亲市场逆转。其次, 我们提出了一个不对称的动态观点, 即不仅强化改革而且衰弱逆转都会提高公司业绩; 同时, 不仅衰弱改革而且强化逆转都会降低业绩。最后, 我们认为, 更有效的公司在每个动态下表现更好。我们用1998-2011年间来自34个新兴市场的1,092家公司的样本对这些论点进行了测试。
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J.-S. 2003. Minimum wages and on-the-job training. Research in Labor Economics, 22: 159–202.
African Development Bank. 2011. Infrastructure and Growth in Zimbabwe: An Action Plan for Sustained Strong Economic Growth. Tunis, Tunisia: Africa Development Bank. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Zimbabwe%20ReportBook22.pdf. October 3, 2017.
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. 2005. Competition and innovation: An inverted-U relationship. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120: 701–728.
Babecky, J., & Havranek, T. 2014. Structural reforms and growth in transition: A meta-analysis. Economics of Transition, 22(1): 13–42.
Babetskii, I., & Campos, N. 2007. Does reform work? An economic examination of the reform-growth puzzle. The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, working paper # 870.
Banalieva, E. 2014. Embracing the second best? Synchronization of reform speeds, excess high-discretion slack, and performance of transition economy firms. Global Strategy Journal, 4(2): 104–126.
Banalieva, E., Eddleston, K., & Zellweger, R. 2015. When do family firms have an advantage in transitioning economies? Toward a dynamic institution-based view. Strategic Management Journal, 36(9): 1358–1377.
Barnett, V., & Lewis, T. 1994. Outliers in statistical data. Chichester: Wiley.
Barrios, S., Gorg, H., & Strobl, E. 2005. Foreign direct investment, competition, and industrial development in the host country. European Economic Review, 49: 1761–1784.
Battese, G., & Coelli, T. 1995. A model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier production function for panel data. Empirical Economics, 20: 325–332.
Baumeister, R., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. 2001. Bad is stronger than good. Review of General Psychology, 5(4): 323–370.
Bhaumik, S., Dang, V., & Kutan, A. 2011. Implications of bank ownership for the credit channel of monetary policy transmission: Evidence from India. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35: 2418–2428.
Bhaumik, S., & Dimova, R. 2013. Does human capital endowment of foreign direct investment recipient countries really matter? Evidence from cross-country firm level data. Review of Development Economics, 17(3): 559–570.
Bhaumik, S., & Dimova, R. 2014. Good and bad institutions: Is the debate over? Cross-country firm-level evidence from the textile industry. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 38: 109–126.
Bhaumik, S., & Kumbhakar, S. 2010. Is the post-reform growth of the Indian manufacturing sector efficiency driven? Empirical evidence from plant level data. Journal of Asian Economics, 21: 219–232.
Blalock, G., & Simon, D. 2009. Do all firms benefit equally from downstream FDI? The moderating effect of local suppliers’ capabilities on productivity gains. Journal of International Business Studies, 40: 1095–1112.
Bloom, N., Schankerman, M., & Van Reenen, J. 2013. Identifying technology spillovers and product market rivalry. Econometrica, 81(4): 1347–1393.
Breslin, S. 2011. The China model and the global crisis. International Affairs, 87(6): 1323–1343.
Bromiley, P., & Harris, J. 2014. A comparison of alternative measures of organizational aspirations. Strategic Management Journal, 35: 338–357.
Buckley, P., & Casson, M. 1976. The future of the multinational enterprise. London: Macmillan.
Cameron, A., Gelbach, J., & Miller, D. 2011. Robust inference with multiway clustering. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 29(2): 238–249.
Campos, N., & Horvath, R. 2012a. Reform redux: Measurement, determinants and growth implications. European Journal of Political Economy, 28: 227–237.
Campos, N., & Horvath, R. 2012b. On the reversibility of structural reforms. Economics Letters, 117: 217–219.
Carnegie, A. 2014. States held hostage: Political hold-up problems and the effects of international institutions. American Political Science Review, 108(1): 54–70.
Chacar, A., Newburry, W., & Vissa, B. 2010. Bringing institutions into performance persistence research: Exploring the impact of product, financial, and labor market institutions. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(7): 1119–1140.
Chaffai, M., Kinda, T., & Plane, P. 2012. Textile manufacturing in eight developing countries: Does business environment matter for firm technical efficiency? The Journal of Development Studies, 48(10): 1470–1488.
Chakrabarti, A., Singh, K., & Mahmood, I. 2007. Diversification and performance: Evidence of East Asian firms. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 101–120.
Chari, M., & Banalieva, E. 2015. How do pro-market reforms impact firm profitability? The case of India under reform. Journal of World Business, 50(2): 357–367.
Chari, M., & David, P. 2012. Sustaining performance in an emerging economy: An empirical test in the Indian context. Strategic Management Journal, 33(2): 217–229.
Claessens, S., & Kose, M. 2009. What is a recession? Finance and Development, 46(1). http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/03/basics.htm. Accessed May 17, 2018.
Coase, R. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(4): 386–405.
Connelly, B., Certo, T., Ireland, D., & Reutzel, C. 2011. Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1): 39–67.
Contractor, F., Kumar, V., Kundu, S., & Pedersen, T. 2010. Reconceptualizing the firm in a world of outsourcing and offshoring: The organizational and geographical relocation of high-value company functions. Journal of Management Studies, 47(8): 1417–1433.
Cook, L. 2015. The Nigerian banking reforms of 2005 may have shielded the economy from the 2008 global recession. Council on African Security and Development. http://www.casade.org/the-nigerian-banking-reforms-of-2005-may-have-shielded-the-economy-from-the-2008-global-recession/. Accessed May 17, 2018.
Correia. 2014. REGHDFE: Stata module to perform linear or instrumental-variable regression absorbing any number of high-dimensional fixed effects. Statistical Software Components S457874, Boston College Department of Economics, revised July 25, 2015.
Criscuolo, P., & Narula, R. 2008. A novel approach to national technological accumulation and absorptive capacity: Aggregating Cohen and Levinthal. The European Journal of Development Research, 20(1): 56–73.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2006. Who cares about corruption? Journal of International Business Studies, 37(6): 807–822.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2012. Extending theory by analyzing developing country multinational companies: Solving the Goldilocks debate. Global Strategy Journal, 2(3): 153–167.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Dau, L. A. 2009a. Pro-market reforms and firm profitability in emerging markets. Academy of Management Journal, 52: 1348–1368.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Dau, L. A. 2009b. Structural reform and firm exports. Management International Review, 49(4): 479–507.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Genc, M. 2008. Transforming disadvantages into advantages: Developing country MNEs in the least developed countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(6): 957–979.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Genc, M. 2011. How context matters: Non-market advantages of developing-country MNEs. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2): 441–445.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2015. The co-evolution of pro-market reforms and emerging market multinationals. In L. Tihanyi, E. Banalieva, T. M. Devinney & T. Pedersen (Eds.), Advances in International Management 28: Emerging Economies and Multinational Enterprises. Emerald.
Dastidar, S., Fisman, R., & Khanna, T. 2008. Testing limits to policy reversal: Evidence from Indian privatization. Journal of Financial Economics, 89: 513–526.
Dedrick, J., Kraemer, K., Palacios, J., & Tigre, P. 2001. Economic liberalization and the computer industry: Comparing outcomes in Brazil and Mexico. World Development, 29: 1199–1214.
Ding, Y., Zhang, H., & Zhang, J. 2008. The financial and operating performance of Chinese family-owned listed firms. Management International Review, 48(3): 297–318.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2002. The regulation of entry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVII(1): 1–38.
Doh, J., Rodrigues, S., Saka-Helmhout, A., & Makhija, M. 2017. International business responses to institutional voids. Journal of International Business Studies, 48: 293–307.
Du, J., & Mickiewicz, T. 2016. Subsidies, rent seeking, and performance: Being young, small, or private in China. Journal of Business Venturing, 31: 22–38.
Dunning, J. 1980. Toward an eclectic theory of international production: Some empirical tests. Journal of International Business Studies, 11(1): 9–31.
EU Business. 2015. EU releases world tax havens black list. http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/economy-politics.120n. Accessed May 17, 2018.
Falcetti, E., Raiser, M., & Sanfey, P. 2002. Defying the odds: Initial conditions, reforms, and growth in the first decade of transition. Journal of Comparative Economics, 30: 229–250.
Fang, S., & Owen, E. 2011. International institutions and credible commitment of non-democracies. Review of International Organizations, 6: 141–162.
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, G., & Petersen, B. 1988. Financing constraints and corporate investment. Brooklings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 141–195.
Fearon, J. 1994. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(Summer): 379–414.
Fisman, R. 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, 91(4): 1095–1102.
García-Canal, E., & Guillén, M. F. 2008. Risk and the strategy of foreign location choice in regulated industries. Strategic Management Journal, 29(10): 1097–1115.
Gormley, T., & Matsa, D. 2016. Playing it safe? Managerial preferences, risk, and agency conflicts. Journal of Financial Economics, 122: 431–455.
Govindarajan, V., & Ramamurti, R. 2011. Reverse innovation, emerging markets, and global strategy. Global Strategy Journal, 1(3–4): 191–205.
Griliches, Z., & Mairesse, J. 1984. Productivity and R&D at the firm level. In Z. Griliches (Ed.), R&D, patent and productivity (pp. 339–374). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Guimaraes, P., & Portugal, P. 2010. A simple feasible alternative procedure to estimate models with high-dimensional fixed effects. Stata Journal, 10(4): 628–649.
Hayton, J. C., George, G., & Zahra, S. A. 2002. National culture and entrepreneurship: A review of behavioral research. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 26(4): 33–52.
Henisz, W. J. 2000. The institutional environment for multinational investment. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16(2): 334–364.
Henisz, W. 2002. The institutional environment of infrastructure investment. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(2): 355–389.
Henisz, W. 2015. The political constraint index (POLCON) dataset. https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/heniszpolcon/polcondataset/. Accessed May 18, 2015.
Hennart, J.-F. 1982. A theory of multinational enterprise. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Holburn, G. L., & Zelner, B. A. 2010. Political capabilities, policy risk, and international investment strategy: Evidence from the global electric power generation industry. Strategic Management Journal, 31(12): 1290–1315.
Holmes, K. R., Feulner, E. J., & O’Grady, M. A. 2008. Index of economic freedom: The link between economic opportunity and prosperity. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street Journal.
Huang, Z. 2003. Evidence of bank lending channel in the UK. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27: 491–510.
Huang, H. 2013. Signal left, turn right: Central rhetoric and local reform in China. Political Research Quarterly, 66(2): 292–305.
IMF. 2005. Statistical appendix to the World Economic Outlook, Table E, pp. 196–197. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/01/pdf/statappx.pdf. Accessed March 6, 2014.
IMF. 2007. Nigeria: Poverty reduction strategy paper—Progress report. IMF country report no. 07/270, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07270.pdf. Accessed March 6, 2017.
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J. 2009. The Uppsala internationalization process model revisited: From liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of International Business Studies, 40: 1411–1431.
Jondrow, J., Lovell, C., Materov, I., & Schmidt, P. 1982. On the estimation of technical efficiency in the stochastic production function model. Journal of Econometrics, 19: 233–238.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47: 263–291.
Karhunen, P., & Kosonen, R. 2013. Institutional constraints for outsourcing services in Russia. Journal of Business Industrial Marketing, 28(3): 201–209.
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. 1997. Why focused strategies may be wrong in emerging markets. Harvard Business Review, 75: 41–51.
Kim, H., Kim, H., & Hoskisson, R. 2010. Does market-oriented institutional change in an emerging economy make business group-affiliated multinationals perform better? An institution-based view. Journal of International Business Studies, 41: 1141–1160.
Klapper, L., Amit, R., Guillen, M., & Quesada, J. 2010. Entrepreneurship and firm formation across countries. In J. Lerner & A. Schoar (Eds.), International differences in entrepreneurship (pp. 129–158). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Koech, J. 2011. Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/annual/2011/annual11b.pdf. October 2, 2017.
Kogut, B., & Singh, H. 1988. The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(3): 411–432.
Koopmans, T. 1951. An analysis of production as an efficient combination of activities. In T. C. Koopmans (Ed.), Activities analysis of production and allocation. New York: Wiley.
Kotler, P., & Caslione, J. 2009. How marketers can respond to recession and turbulence. Journal of Customer Behaviour, 8(2): 187–191.
Kramarenko, V., Engstrom, L., Verdier, G., Fernandez, G., Oppers, S., Hughes, R., et al. 2010. Zimbabwe: Challenges and policy options after hyperinflation, IMF: African Department. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2010/afr1003.pdf. October 2, 2017.
Kumaraswamy, A., Mudambi, R., Saranga, H., & Tripathy, A. 2012. Catch-up strategies in the Indian auto components industry: Domestic firms’ responses to market liberalization. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(4): 368–395.
Kumbhakar, S., & Lovell, C. 2003. Stochastic frontier analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kwok, C., & Tadesse, S. 2006. National culture and financial systems. Journal of International Business Studies, 37(2): 227–247.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1999. The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1): 222–279.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2008. The economic consequences of legal origins. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2): 285–332.
La Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6): 1113–1155.
Lee, S. H., & Weng, D. H. 2013. Does bribery in the home country promote or dampen firm exports? Strategic Management Journal, 34(12): 1472–1487.
Luo, Y., & Tung, R. L. 2007. International expansion of emerging market enterprises: A springboard perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4): 481–498.
Luo, Y., & Tung, R. 2018. A general theory of springboard MNEs. Journal of International Business Studies, 49: 129–152.
Luo, Y., & Wang, S. 2012. Foreign direct investment strategies by developing country multinationals: A diagnostic model for home country effects. Global Strategy Journal, 2(3): 244–261.
Majumdar, S., & Bhattacharjee, A. 2014. Firms, markets, and the state: Institutional change and manufacturing sector profitability variances in India. Organization Science, 25(2): 509–528.
McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. 2003. Entrepreneurship in a harsh business climate: Reform-era Vietnam, Version (A). Stanford Graduate School of Business, Case #: IB-45. Stanford, CA: Stanford University.
Mehran, H., & Stulz, R. 2007. The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions. Journal of Financial Economics, 85: 267–296.
Merlevede, B. 2003. Reform reversals and output growth in transition economies. Economics of Transition, 11(4): 649–669.
Meyer, K., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S., & Peng, M. 2009. Institutions, resources, and entry strategies in emerging economies. Strategic Management Journal, 30: 61–80.
Meyer, K., & Peng, M. 2016. Theoretical foundations of emerging economy business research. Journal of International Business Studies, 47(1): 3–22.
Moulton, B. 1990. An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the effects of aggregate variables on micro units. Review of Economics and Statistics, 72(2): 334–338.
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1992. The transition to a market economy: Pitfalls of partial reform. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3): 889–906.
Narula, R., & Driffield, N. 2012. Does FDI cause development? The ambiguity of the evidence and why it matters. European Journal of Development Research, 24: 1–7.
Narula, R., & Dunning, J. 2010. Multinational enterprises, development, and globalization: Some clarifications and a research agenda. Oxford Development Studies, 38(3): 263–287.
Narula, R., & Verbeke, A. 2015. Making internalization theory good for practice: The essence of Alan Rugman’s contributions to international business. Journal of World Business, 50(4): 612–622.
Nee, V., & Matthews, R. 1996. Market transition and societal transformation in reforming state socialism. Annual Review of Sociology, 22: 401–435.
North, D. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, D. 1992. Transaction costs, institutions, and economic performance. San Francisco, CA: International Center for Economic Growth.
OSIRIS. 2014. OSIRIS database. https://osiris.bvdinfo.com/version-201845/home.serv?product=osirisneo. Accessed May 17, 2014.
Park, S., Li, S., & Tse, D. 2006. Market liberalization and firm performance during China’s economic transition. Journal of International Business Studies, 37: 127–147.
Peng, M., Ahlstrom, D., Carraher, S., & Shi, W. 2017. An institution-based view of global IPR history. Journal of International Business Studies, 48: 893–907.
Peng, M. W., & Heath, P. S. 1996. The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition: Institutions, organizations, and strategic choice. Academy of Management Review, 21(2): 492–528.
Peng, M., Wang, D., & Jiang, Y. 2008. An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 39: 920–936.
Pinkham, B., & Peng, M. 2017. Overcoming institutional voids via arbitration. Journal of International Business Studies, 48: 344–359.
Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. 2003. The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the twentieth century. Journal of Financial Economics, 69: 5–50.
Ramamurti, R. 2012. What is really different about emerging market multinationals? Global Strategy Journal, 2(1): 41–47.
Rangan, S. 2000. Search and deliberation in international exchange: Microfoundations to some macro patterns. Journal of International Business Studies, 31(2): 205–222.
Rodrik, D. 1989. Promises, promises: Credible policy reform via signaling. The Economic Journal, 99(September): 756–772.
Rodrik, D. 1996. Understanding economic policy reform. Journal of Economic Literature, 34: 9–41.
Rugman, A. 1980. A new theory of the multinational-enterprise internationalization versus internalization. Columbia Journal of World Business, 15(1): 23–29.
Rugman, A. 1981. Inside the multinationals: The economics of internal markets. New York: Columbia University Press.
Sahay, R., & Goyal, R. 2006. Volatility and growth in Latin America: An episodic approach. IMF working paper, WP/06/287. Accessed May 19, 2015.
Sarathy, R., & Banalieva, E. R. 2014. Economic development and marketing strategies: A comparative lens. Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies, 5(1): 49–73.
Schelling, T. 1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Simmons, B. 2000. Money and the law: Why comply with the public international law of money? Yale Journal of International Law, 25(2): 323–362.
Sojli, E., & Tham, W. 2017. Foreign political connections. Journal of International Business Studies, 48(2): 244–266.
Spence, M. 1973. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87: 355–374.
United Nations. 2017. Geographic regions. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49. Accessed May 17, 2017.
Voss, G., Sirdeshmukh, D., & Voss, Z. 2008. The effects of slack resources and environmental threat on product exploration and exploitation. Academy of Management Journal, 51(1): 147–164.
Walsh, J. 2007. Do states play signaling games? Cooperation and Conflict, 42(4): 442–459.
Williamson, O. 1975. Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and anti-trust implications. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, J. 1990. Latin American adjustment: How much has happened?. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
World Bank. 2014. World development indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. Accessed May 17, 2014.
Yago, M., & Morgan, W. 2008. The impact of policy reversals on economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa. European Journal of Political Economy, 24: 88–106.
Yergin, D., & Stanislaw, J. 1998. The commanding heights: The battle for the world economy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Acknowledgements
Authors listed in alphabetical order. We thank the editor, Rajneesh Narula, for his guidance in the review process and for suggesting the macro–micro link, and the anonymous reviewers for valuable insights that helped us improve the manuscript. We also thank Todd Alessandri, Paul Beamish, Oana Branzei, Keith Brouthers, Murali Chari, Charles Dhanaraj, Sergio Correia, Harry Lane, Dev Jennings, Grigorios Livanis, Jerry Loporto, Ed McDonough III, J.T. Li, Will Mitchell, Romel Mostafa, William Ocasio, Sheila Puffer, Ravi Ramamurti, Chris Robertson, Ayse Saka-Helmhout, Michael Sartor, Jean-Louis Schaan, Andreas Schotter, Laszlo Tihanyi, Anthea Zhang, other anonymous reviewers, and audiences at the Academy of International Business and the Academy of Management, for their useful feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript. Banalieva is grateful to the Gary Gregg Fellowship for research support. Cuervo-Cazurra thanks the Walsh Research Professorship, Morrison Fellowship, and Mullin Fellowship for financial support.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Supplementary information accompanies this article on the Journal of International Business Studies website (www.palgrave.com/journals).
Accepted by Rajneesh Narula, Area Editor, 11 April 2018. This article has been with the authors for four revisions.
Electronic supplementary material
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Banalieva, E.R., Cuervo-Cazurra, A. & Sarathy, R. Dynamics of pro-market institutions and firm performance. J Int Bus Stud 49, 858–880 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-018-0155-7
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-018-0155-7