The governance impact of a changing investor landscape

Abstract

Within the backdrop of comparative corporate governance research, we draw on the managerial reporting and impression management literatures to examine how the type, level, and nature of foreign shareholders, infused with their own governance logic, influence initial managerial earnings optimism and how foreign ownership shapes earnings guidance in a stakeholder-oriented setting. Drawing on Japanese data, and addressing endogeneity concerns, our results show that under the presence of foreign owners, managers are more optimistic in their initial earnings forecasts, but that in subsequent revisions they are more likely to provide timely adjustments of their earnings forecast and avoid making last-minute adjustments. This research illustrates how foreign practices travel across borders and contributes to understanding triggers to governance and strategic changes.

Résumé

Dans le contexte de la recherche comparative sur la gouvernance d’entreprise, nous nous appuyons sur les littératures relatives au reporting managérial et la gestion de l’impression pour examiner comment le type, le niveau et la nature des actionnaires étrangers, plongés dans leur propre logique de gouvernance, influencent l’optimisme initial relatif aux bénéfices managériaux et comment la propriété étrangère forme les résultats prévisionnels dans un contexte orienté vers les parties prenantes. Nous appuyant sur des données japonaises, et répondant aux préoccupations sur l’endogénéité, nos résultats montrent qu’en présence de propriétaires étrangers, les dirigeants sont plus optimistes concernant les prévisions initiales sur les résultats, mais que dans les révisions subséquentes, ils sont plus susceptibles d’apporter des ajustements en temps voulu sur leurs prévisions de bénéfices et évitent de faire des ajustements de dernière minute. Cette recherche illustre comment des pratiques étrangères dépassent les frontières et contribue à comprendre les déclencheurs des changements de gouvernance et stratégiques.

Resumen

Dentro del contexto de la investigación de gobierno corporativo comparado, nos basamos en las literaturas de reportes de gestión y gestión de la impresión para examinar como el tipo, el nivel, y la naturaleza de los accionistas extranjeros, infundidos con su propia lógica de gobierno, influyen en el optimismo inicial de ganancias gerenciales y como la propiedad extranjera da forma a la previsión de beneficios en un entorno orientado por los grupos de interés. Basados en datos japoneses, y abordando las preocupaciones de endogeneidad, nuestros resultados muestran que ante la presencia de dueños extranjeros, los gerentes son más optimistas en sus previsiones de ganancias iniciales, pero que en las revisiones posteriores es más probable que proporcionen oportunamente ajustes de su pronóstico de ganancias y eviten hacer ajustes de último minuto. Esta investigación ilustra como las prácticas extranjeras viajan entre las fronteras y contribuyen a entender desencadenantes a la gobernanza y a cambios estratégicos.

Resumo

Dentro do cenário de uma pesquisa comparada sobre governança corporativa, nós nos baseamos na literatura sobre comunicação gerencial e gestão de impressão para examinar como o tipo, o nível e a natureza dos acionistas estrangeiros, imersos nas suas suas próprias lógicas de governança, influenciam o otimismo gerencial inicial sobre lucros e como a propriedade estrangeira molda a orientação para lucros em um ambiente voltado para stakeholders. Baseando-se em dados japoneses e considerando preocupações sobre endogeneidade, nossos resultados mostram que, sob a presença de proprietários estrangeiros, os gestores são mais otimistas nas suas previsões iniciais de lucros, mas em revisões posteriores eles são mais propensos a fornecer ajustes na sua previsão de lucros e evitar fazer ajustes de última hora. Essa pesquisa ilustra como práticas estrangeiras viajam através das fronteiras e contribuem para a compreensão gatilhos para a governança e mudanças estratégicas.

概要

在公司治理比较研究的背景下,我们借鉴管理报表和印象管理文献来研究外国股东的类型、级别和性质,经过融入他们自己的治理逻辑,如何影响初始管理收益乐观性和外国所有权如何在面向利益相关者的设置中塑造收益指导。借鉴日本的数据,并解决内生性的问题,我们的研究结果表明,在外国股东存在的情况下,经理人更看好他们的初始收益预测,但在后续的修正中他们更有可能进行收益预测的及时调整,并避免做最后一分钟的调整。这项研究说明国外做法是如何跨越国界的,并有助于理解治理和战略变化的触发器。

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Correspondence to Ruth V. Aguilera.

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Accepted by Douglas Cumming, Guest Editor, on 1 September 2016. This article has been with the authors for two revisions.

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Aguilera, R.V., Desender, K.A., Lamy, M.L. et al. The governance impact of a changing investor landscape. J Int Bus Stud 48, 195–221 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-016-0043-y

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Keywords

  • comparative corporate governance
  • foreign ownership
  • management reporting
  • comparative accounting systems and practices
  • institutionalism