Abstract
This paper studies the senior unsecured bondholders’ bail-in expectations and market monitoring following bail-in legislative events aimed at introducing new tools for subordination. We measure bail-in expectations using a difference in differences approach that compares the reaction to bail-in events of senior unsecured bonds to the reaction of non-bailinable bonds. Similarly, we measure senior unsecured bondholders’ monitoring activity by using a triple differencing analysis that compares the yield-risk sensitivity reaction of senior unsecured bonds with respect to that of non-bailinable bonds. Our results indicate unaffected bail-in expectations by senior unsecured bondholders who, accordingly, do not enhance their pricing of banks’ risk.
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Appendix 1
Appendix 1
The triple differencing empirical model is:
We can assume that bank risk can take only two values (risk = s = safe or rsk = r = risky), that post can take two values (post = pre = before treatment or post = post = after treatment), that uns can take two values (uns = u = senior unsecured or uns = n = non-bailinable) and that E(u|uns, post, risk, X) = 0 (where X is the set of control variables in the DDD regression model). It can be shown (by calculating the expectations relative to the triple differencing empirical model) that the \({\beta }_{3}\) is the difference between two time-series changes in sensitivities:
where (yld|r u post − yld|s u post) is a difference in expected values describing the sensitivity of the yield of a senior unsecured bond to an increase in risk from s to r, after the bail-in event. (yld|r u pre − yld|s u pre) is a difference in expected values describing the sensitivity of the yield of a senior unsecured bond to an increase in risk from s to r, before the bail-in event. (yld|r n post − yld|s n post) is a difference in expected values describing the sensitivity of the yield of a non-bailinable bond to an increase in risk from s to r, after the bail-in event. (yld|r n pre − yld|s n pre) is a difference in expected values describing the sensitivity of the yield of a non-bailinable bond to an increase in risk from s to r, before the bail-in event.
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Velliscig, G., Polato, M., Floreani, J. et al. The bail-in credibility: barking dogs seldom bite. J Bank Regul 25, 1–19 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-022-00210-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-022-00210-7