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Threats to monetary policy independence: reasons to be concerned

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Abstract

Several legislative efforts are under way that aim to impose greater congressional oversight of and influence on the monetary policy decision making of the Federal Reserve System. Some of these initiatives might do little harm or even make marginal improvements. But others pose more serious threats to the operational independence of monetary policy. Proposals to require the Federal Reserve to frame monetary policy decisions according to a mathematical formula imply a concrete simplicity of policy that is inaccurate and misleading. And the reporting requirements associated with these proposals threaten to negate the major advantage of monetary policy as a countercyclical weapon—speed. Proposals to subject the non-monetary policy functions of the Fed to the appropriations process provide Congress with additional leverage that could be used to apply pressure to monetary policy decisions. For its part, the Fed should continue to increase transparency through more timely and complete release of relevant information and analysis. To best promote the objectives of stable prices and maximum employment, the operational independence of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy decision making needs to be preserved and protected.

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Correspondence to David J. Stockton.

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Stockton, D.J. Threats to monetary policy independence: reasons to be concerned. Bus Econ 52, 118–122 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s11369-017-0033-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s11369-017-0033-5

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