Avoiding a Nuclear Catastrophe: Arms Control after the 2002 India–Pakistan Crisis

Abstract

Regional Armageddon in South Asia is a real danger — one that argues for a comprehensive nuclear arms control regime as the best strategy to avoid a nuclear exchange in a future Indo-Pakistani crisis. Without a nuclear arms control regime, India and Pakistan are condemned to live in a situation resembling a permanent Cuban Missile Crisis. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk-reduction measures (NRRMs) are necessary, but they must be seen as building blocks to negotiate a robust nuclear arms control regime. Unlike CBMs and NRRMs, a nuclear arms control regime could start a process of nuclear rollback and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons from South Asia. This article examines the past obstacles to a nuclear arms control regime, and argues that slow-motion nuclear weaponization opens a window of opportunity for nuclear arms control, if India and Pakistan can reach a verifiable agreement not to deploy nuclear weapons. The concluding section outlines the main elements of a robust nuclear arms control regime in South Asia.