Abstract
Fraudulent and abusive practices in the securities markets strongly damage investor confidence, and raise cost of capital for issuers, thus hampering development of the capital markets. This article compares market abuse regimes established by the Turkish and the European Union (EU) legislations. The Turkish market abuse regime provides an essential conceptual framework for preventing and combating insider dealing and market manipulation. However, Turkey's membership negotiations with the EU require implementation of the EU legislations, including market abuse rules. This article argues that although current Turkish regulatory framework provides important rules and mechanisms to prevent and combat market abuse, it is not exactly compatible with EU market abuse regime. Implementation of the EU market abuse regime requires some other amendments and improvements in Turkish legislations.
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References
The Capital Market Law is the main act regarding the regulation and supervision of capital markets in Turkey. See English version of the CML at http://www.cmb.gov.tr/, accessed 14 February 2011.
The Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse).
Avgouleas, E. (2005) The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, A Legal and Economic Analysis. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, p. 253.
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Siems, M.M. (2008) The EU market abuse directive: A case-based analysis, http://www.ssrn.com, accessed 26 August 2009, p. 6.
See CML art. 47 (1-A-1), note 1; although the CML does not provide a definition regarding inside information, the RRPDSC defines inside information as information that would be likely to have an effect on the value of the capital market instruments and investors’ investment decisions, and which has not been disclosed yet. See s. 4 (1-f).
See MAD art. 2 (1) and 4, note 2; see also Siems, note 5, pp. 6–7.
Avgouleas, E. (2005) A critical evaluation of the new EC financial-market regulation: Peaks, troughs, and the road ahead. The Transnational Lawyer 18: 202; Moloney, note 4, pp. 961–964.
See CML art. 47 (1-A-1), note 1.
See Avgouleas, note 3, pp. 252–253.
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See CML art. 47 (1-A-2), note 1.
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See CML art. 47 (1-A-3), note 1.
See MAD art. 6 (1) and (2), note 2; Avgouleas, note 8, pp. 210–211; Moloney, note 4, pp. 969–974.
See RRPDSCs. 14 (1).
RRPDSCs. 15 (1), note 19.
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RRPDSCs 16 (1), note 19.
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See MAD art. 6 (9), note 2; Avgouleas, note 3, p. 288; Moloney, note 4, p. 997.
Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices, the definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification of managers’ transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions.
See AMPD art. 1 (3), note 25.
See AMPD art. 7, note 25.
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See AMPD art. 9, note 25.
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See MAD art. 11, note 2; Avgouleas, note 3, p. 290.
Rider, B., Alexander, K., Linklater, L. and Bazley, S. (2009) Market Abuse and Insider Dealing. West Sussex, UK: Tottel Publishing, p. 86.
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See CML art. 45 (2), note 1.
See CML art. 45 (3), note 1.
See ISERs. 23 (1–2).
ISERs. 25 (1-b), note 36.
See CPC art. 135.
CPC art. 135 (7), note 38.
See MAD art. 14 (1), note 2; Siems, note 5, p. 25.
See CML art. 47 (1-A), note 1.
See CML art. 49, note 1.
See MAD art. 14 (1), note 2; Avgouleas, note 3, p. 290; Moloney, note 4, pp. 999–1000.
See CML art. 46 (1-i), note 1.
See CML art. 47/A and 46 (1-g), note 1.
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Disclaimer The opinions expressed herein are the author's own personal opinions and do not represent Capital Markets Board of Turkey's view in anyway.
Paper presented at the twenty-seventh International Symposium on Economic Crime, ‘The Enemy Within – internal threats to the stability and integrity of financial institutions’, 30 August – 6 September 2009, Jesus College, University of Cambridge.
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Cetin, N. Market abuse regime in Turkey. J Bank Regul 12, 227–235 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1057/jbr.2011.5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/jbr.2011.5