Abstract
The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is a multilateral regime designed to control exports of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies to contribute to regional and international security and stability. Unlike traditional arms control and disarmament agreements WA is not legally binding. It has to rely on cooperation and voluntary compliance of the actors concerned – principally states and industries. For them the WA provides guidance for cooperation and compliance. The question is whether the actors involved are interested in complying with the guidelines. The article applies two IR theories to address this question, liberal institutionalism and realism. One argument of liberal institutionalism is that international institutions and regimes not only have a vital catalytic role to play in promoting cooperation among states, but they also develop synergetic effects and reinforce each other in the framework of effective multilateralism. In many ways this might well be the case, but the opposite is also true. The economic interests of member states and jealousy between them have long hampered cooperation among the various regimes that have been designed to act as the multilayered export control and non-proliferation system that all involved have agreed is necessary. But it is not only liberal institutionalism that fails to explain the behavior of states, international institutions and regimes. For realists, it is states’ interests that matter, with common norms, rules and principles mattering less, if at all. But contrary to the realist argument, states do also support the general guidelines and best practices of the international institutions that have been created to avoid the destabilizing effects of the accumulation of certain categories of conventional arms and the proliferation of dangerous weapons. Neither realism nor liberal institutionalism is fully able to capture the complex relationship between the interests of individual countries and general principles and norms. The diplomatic delegations in multilateral fora have the difficult task of identifying the cumulative interests of the countries they represent. They have to support and reject cooperation with states and other export control regimes and institutions, often at the same time.
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Notes
Council Common Position on the Control of Arms Brokering, Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of arms brokering.
When the chairs of the WA, MTCR, AG, NSG and ZC met in Vienna in June 2005, their agenda was strictly technical and without any real substantive component.
The PoA was agreed to at the first UN SALW conference, in July 2001.
A necessary supplement in a reviewed version would be the explicit inclusion of the commitment not to transfer the items to non-state actors. – Taking Control: The Case for a More Effective European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, A report by European Union Non-Governmental Organizations, September 2004.
The caveat on all of these lists is that defense systems and technologies are becoming increasingly complex – composed of exotic materials, diodes, resistors, parts, components, relays, subsystems, systems, assemblies and software. In 2008, the plenary agreed to include some technically complex areas such as on low-light level and infrared sensors in the control lists. (Public Statement, 2008) – It is becoming increasingly difficult to identify components or functions that may be concealed. Increased miniaturization and increasingly complex systems mean that the possibility of the hostile use of such components is only just beginning (Spencer, 2005, p. 27).
‘Relative losses’ is the mirror of the concept ‘relative gains’ that says that states cooperate only if others do not gain more in the process of cooperation (Grieco, 1988).
Representatives from industries at the Wassenaar Arrangement, Outreach to Industry Seminar, Vienna, 3 October 2005.
Defined in a Statement by Nobel Peace Laureates, 1997.
President George W. Bush's speech to the U.N. General Assembly and US Secretary of State Colin Powell's attempt at the United Nations to prove the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the Iraq War serving as striking examples of this claim.
Resolution 1540 (2004), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004.
According to the planned agreement with the United States and India, which has not signed the NPT and is already a nuclear weapon state, it would place only 14 of 22 power reactors under IAEA safeguards. It will be allowed to enrich uranium, build a heavy water reactor and reprocess plutonium, build a fast breeder and develop the whole nuclear fuel cycle. In addition India is building medium- and long-range missiles (Aghi II and III). It also violates the UN Security Council 1172 of 1998 that prohibits India (and Pakistan) to develop nuclear weapon programs and the development of ballistic missiles (White House, 2006).
A rare example is the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, a group that has explored new tools to enable business to comply with binding human rights standards. Unfortunately, this initiative currently covers only a handful of companies. The United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, appointed John Ruggie as a Special Representative on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations to find answers on what minimum human rights standards multinational corporations should have to adhere to. International Herald Tribune, 18 August 2005.
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I am deeply indebted to Ian Cuthbertson. He deceased in February 2009.
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Gärtner, H. Towards a theory of arms export control. Int Polit 47, 125–143 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2009.25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2009.25