IMF Economic Review

, Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 644–691 | Cite as

IMF Lending and Banking Crises

  • Luca Papi
  • Andrea F Presbitero
  • Alberto Zazzaro


This paper looks at the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs on banking crises in a large sample of developing countries, over the period 1970–2010. The endogeneity of the IMF intervention is addressed by adopting an instrumental variable strategy and a propensity score matching estimator. Controlling for the standard determinants of banking crises, the results indicate that countries participating in IMF-supported lending programs are significantly less likely to experience a future banking crisis than nonborrowing countries. The paper also provides evidence suggesting that compliance with conditionality and loan size matter, corroborating the importance of IMF-supported reform and liquidity provision for banking sector stability.

JEL Classifications

F33 F34 F35 O11 


Supplementary material

41308_2015_BFimfer201516_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (101 kb)
Online Appendix


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Copyright information

© International Monetary Fund 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luca Papi
  • Andrea F Presbitero
  • Alberto Zazzaro

There are no affiliations available

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