Abstract
Interest group influence represents the Higgs boson of contemporary social research. Scholars have tried to define and measure influence for decades: tens of different definitions are used in the literature and as many methods to measure it can be found. The literature has recently converged towards an agreement on how to study interest group influence: preference attainment. The latter has monopolised the research in the literature in the last years. Yet, a discussion on what preference attainment is, what it does and what it does not is still missing in the literature. This works aims to fill this gap by providing a theoretical and methodological informed discussion on interest group influence and preference attainment. In so doing, I propose a novel method to apply preference attainment in an effective and efficient manner.
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Notes
In Klüver (2009) the initial policy output is the Commission proposal issued before the consultations with stakeholders and the final policy output is the adopted proposal. Similarly, in Bernhagen (2012) the initial policy output is the government policy proposal and the final one is the enacted legislation.
The measure used in this section for the reference point is what Bernhagen et al (2014) term improvement to reversion point. Nonetheless, it should be noted that I build on that measure only to account for the distance between the actor’s position and the reference point, as their measure does not take into consideration the status quo.
An example of an explicit a priori approach can be found in Klüver’s (2009) (see, for instance, Table 1 on p. 541).
Another option is Item Response Theory (IRT), initially used to analyse surveys and questionnaires and then adopted in several other fields.
Documents providing information for actors’ preferences and policy outcomes can be analysed through various methods, such as (manual or computer assisted) content analysis and discourse analysis.
Future applications of this approach should consider individual interest groups and derive coalitions empirically with MDS and not assuming them a priori as done in this section. Furthermore, the positions of institutional actors, such as the EP and individual member states in this case, can also be included in the analysis, as done in the Resolving Controversy in the EU project (Thomson, 2011). Nonetheless, the simplicity of the analysis is functional to the illustrative purposes of this work.
As mentioned above, it should be noted that in ex post methodologies the choice of factors (but not dimensions) is theoretically driven.
It should be noted that the reference point would be much closer to the tobacco industry preferences if only the dimension ‘EU intervention’ was taken into consideration.
This conclusion needs to be taken with caution. The analysis in this section is for illustrative purposes only and it does not take into considerations several important aspects of the case under analysis, such as the fact that the directive was blocked for 7 years in the Council.
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vannoni, m., dür, a. studying preference attainment using spatial models. Eur Polit Sci 16, 369–382 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2016.13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2016.13