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Executive–Legislative Relations Without a Government

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Abstract

Traditionally, it is assumed that the executive strongly controls Parliament within the Belgian political system. The absence of a federal government following the 2010 elections had three consequences on the activity of the Belgian Parliament. Some actions were put on hold, and essential reforms were delayed. On other issues, however, Members of Parliament took the lead, developing ad hoc majorities that cut across earlier cleavages between majority and opposition. Third, however, parties continued to vote along the majority of the caretaker government. While it could be expected that this situation, in the long run, might lead to a stronger position of Parliament vis-à-vis government, it is to be expected that traditional power relations will be restored once a full government has been formed.

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Notes

  1. The caretaker government led by Prime Minister Yves Leterme is composed of the Flemish and Francophone Christian-democrats (CD&V and cdH), Francophone socialists (PS), Flemish and Francophone liberals (Open VLD and MR). On basis of the results of the 2010 federal elections, the five parties hold 83 of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives. They divide between thirty Flemish MPs (out of eighty-eight) and fifty-three Francophone MPs (out of sixty-two).

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Pilet, JB. Executive–Legislative Relations Without a Government. Eur Polit Sci 11, 96–101 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2011.61

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