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Beyond Judicialization: Why We Need More Comparative Research About Constitutional Courts

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Abstract

Constitutional courts play an increasing role in policymaking and the concepts of comparative politics. Traditionally, research has focused on the Judicialization hypothesis for European courts. This article argues that there is a major research gap regarding justices’ preferences, intra- and inter-institutional rules and that it is necessary to move beyond the Judicialization hypothesis to integrate courts in concepts of comparative politics. It outlines four theoretical and methodological challenges for future research on constitutional courts.

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  1. Technische Universität Kaiserslautern, Erwin-Schroedinger-Straße 57/480, Kaiserslautern, D-67653, Germany

    Christoph Hönnige

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Hönnige, C. Beyond Judicialization: Why We Need More Comparative Research About Constitutional Courts. Eur Polit Sci 10, 346–358 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2010.51

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