Notes
Gilardi cannot, therefore, subscribe to the view that regulators are invariably captured by their supervising legislatures, as a simple principal–agent theory would suggest. Although he specifically excludes the question of how independent these regulatory agencies are ‘in fact’, he would presumably cite institutional features of the agency in explaining their autonomy, rather than the legal-administrative features Croley cites.
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Hanretty, C. Protecting Regulators. Eur Polit Sci 7, 453–459 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2008.32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2008.32