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Flexibilité des règles et participation individuelle à l’action collective: Cas de l’Union des Groupements de Producteurs du Périmètre irrigué de Malanville au Bénin

Abstract

This article analyses the determinants of individual participation in collective irrigation management, in terms of the payment of fees and participation in collective maintenance. It is based on a case study of the Union des Groupements de Producteurs du Périmètre Irrigué de Malanville (General Union of Producers of the irrigated perimeter in Malanville, UGPPM) in Benin. Data was collected through a survey sent to a random sample of 183 respondents, each belonging to one of five producers’ cooperatives within the UGPPM. The statistical results indicate that cooperative members who have large families or are dissatisfied with the financial management of the UGPPM do not pay irrigation fees; whereas female and elderly cooperative members, and those who perceive the UGPPM decision-making process as autocratic, do not regularly participate in collective maintenance activities. The socio-cultural homogeneity of the UGPPM sustains the flexibility of rules and facilitates free riding.

Abstract

Le présent article analyse les déterminants de la participation individuelle à la gestion collective des systèmes d’irrigation en termes de paiement des redevances et de participation aux travaux collectifs d’entretien à travers le cas de l’Union des Groupements de Producteurs du Périmètre irrigué de Malanville (UGPPM) au Bénin. Les données ont été collectées avec un questionnaire adressé à 183 coopérateurs choisis aléatoirement au sein de cinq groupements mutualistes de producteurs de l’UGPPM et un focus group. Les résultats statistiques ont montré d’une part que les coopérateurs ayant une charge familiale élevée, ou ceux percevant la gestion financière des responsables comme défaillante, ne paient pas leurs redevances réglementaires. D’autre part, les femmes, les coopérateurs anciens dans le périmètre, ou ceux percevant les processus de prise de décisions comme autocratiques ne participent pas régulièrement aux travaux collectifs d’entretien. L’homogénéité socio-culturelle de l’UGPPM supporte une telle flexibilité des règles favorisant le comportement de passager clandestin.

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Correspondence to Ismail Moumouni.

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Jimmy, K., Moumouni, I. Flexibilité des règles et participation individuelle à l’action collective: Cas de l’Union des Groupements de Producteurs du Périmètre irrigué de Malanville au Bénin. Eur J Dev Res 27, 745–761 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2014.56

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Keywords

  • action collective
  • participation individuelle
  • systèmes d’irrigation
  • homogénéité socio-culturelle
  • flexibilité des règles
  • Bénin