International Politics Reviews

, Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 88–93 | Cite as

The Role of Bargaining in the Ongoing Process of Institutional Design

Review of Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations? Normative Pressures and Decision-Making Rules by Alexandru Grigorescu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)
  • Joel H. WestraEmail author
Book Review

Today’s international system is a complex environment comprising legalized rules of state interaction, formalized arrangements for negotiation, enforcement, and implementation of such rules, and informal norms that pertain both to state interaction in general and to processes of bargaining, enforcement, and implementation of agreed rules. Much research in the field of international relations has sought to understand this complex environment using theoretical approaches that treat power, interests, and ideas as competing explanations for observed phenomena. Increasingly, however, scholars are working to develop approaches that treat these explanations as complementary, though in doing so they face an accompanying challenge of maintaining parsimony and falsifiability in the development of theory.

Taking up this challenge, Alexandru Grigorescu addresses the question of Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations?by examining changes in decision-making rules within such organizations as...


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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Calvin CollegeGrand RapidsUSA

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