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The Slowdown in Global Trade: A Symptom of a Weak Recovery?

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Abstract

Global trade growth has slowed since 2012 relative both to its strong historical performance and to overall economic growth. This paper aims to quantify the role of weak economic growth and changes in its decomposition in accounting for the slowdown in trade using a reduced form and a structural approach. Both analytical investigations suggest that the overall weakness in economic activity, particularly investment, has been the primary restraint on trade growth, accounting for about 80% of the decline in the growth of the volume of goods trade between 2012–2016 and 2003–2007. However, other factors are also weighing on trade in recent years, especially in emerging market and developing economies, as evidenced by the non-negligible role attributed to trade costs by the structural approach.

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Fig. 1

Source: IMF staff calculations

Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Source: IMFstaff calculations

Fig. 4

Source: IMFstaff calculations

Fig. 5

Source: IMF staff calculations

Fig. 6

Source: IMF staff calculations

Fig. 7

Source: IMF staff calculations

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Notes

  1. Constantinescu et al. (2015) argue that the decline in trade growth relative to economic growth may have begun in the early 2000s. Since their finding hinges to a significant extent on the choice of measurement to aggregate global trade and GDP, we follow the vast majority of the literature and focus on the sharp decline in trade volume growth since the end of 2011 (see also Ollivaud and Schwellnus 2015; OECD 2016).

  2. See Baldwin (2009) and papers therein, Bussière et al. (2013), Eaton et al. (2016) and Levchenko et al. (2010), among others.

  3. Hoekman (2015) and papers therein, ECB (2016), Kindberg-Hanlon and Young (2016), Lewis and Monarch (2016), OECD (2016), Ollivaud and Schwellnus (2015) and Timmer et al. (2016), among others, examine the drivers of the global trade slowdown. Amiti et al. (2016) and Hong et al. (2016), on the other hand, examine the drivers of slowing trade in the case of the USA and China, respectively.

  4. Data on total nominal and real trade for goods and services, as well as imports deflator and GDP deflator used in Sections II and III, are from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database. Sectoral real trade flows which underpin Fig. 2, panel 5, are constructed from disaggregated data on trade values and quantities at the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS) two-digit level from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics database. See IMF (2016) for more details.

  5. Following the literature, we do not restrict the elasticity of imports to aggregate demand to be one. See the appendix of Bussière et al. (2013) for a theoretical foundation for an elasticity that is not restricted to one.

  6. Import intensities evolve over time, in response to changing trade costs and international production fragmentation. As the goal of our analysis is to quantify the importance of these other factors in the recent trade slowdown, we use the average import content for each country. It is also worth noting that if import intensity were perfectly measured in each period and the import intensity weights were allowed to vary over time, the model would be able to fully account for the level of imports (although not their growth rates).

  7. See IMF (2015b), Jääskelä and Mathews (2015), Morel (2015), Hong et al. (2016), and Martinez-Martin (2016) for further examples of analysis of trade growth based on import-intensity-adjusted aggregate demand, with substantially smaller samples of countries.

  8. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

  9. The inclusion of a generated regressor in Eq. (6) complicates the consistent estimation of standard errors of the regression coefficients. Moreover, all models implicitly treat changes in relative import (or export) prices as exogenous, which is not necessarily the case, and may lead to biased estimates of the price elasticity of imports (exports). However, as noted above, we are interested only in the predicted import growth, rather than the elasticities or their confidence intervals.

  10. This finding is in line with Slopek (2015) who demonstrates that the shift in relative growth from advanced toward emerging market economies can account for much of the decline in the global trade elasticity in light of the lower income elasticity of trade of the latter.

  11. The findings discussed below are robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects in Eq. (7) or to clustering the standard errors by country.

  12. These findings are also robust to controlling for the role of uncertainty, global financial conditions, and financial stress in the economy when analyzing the import demand model residuals, as discussed in IMF (2016).

  13. For comparison, Abiad et al. (2014) estimate that the tariff-equivalent costs of a financial crisis in the importer country are between 1 and 2% in the year of the crisis and in the range of 2–5% in the year following the crisis. The contemporaneous tariff equivalent costs of terrorist incidents, revolutions, and interethnic conflicts calculated by Blomberg and Hess (2006) are also in the range of 1–3%.

  14. To correct for the potential for role of trade policies in shaping economic activity, we first purge aggregate demand components of the effect of trade policies before constructing our measure of IAD. Doing so yields slightly larger “missing” trade growth during 2012–2016. For the average economy, the share of the decline in import growth predicted by changes in economic activity—by construction orthogonal to trade policies—and relative prices is 83%, compared to the 86% using the baseline specification. See IMF (2016) for further details.

  15. As is the case with most general equilibrium models of trade, certain channels through which trade affects output, for example, the dynamic productivity gains from greater trade openness, are not captured.

  16. This model incorporates the canonical Ricardian trade model of Eaton and Kortum (2002). Eaton et al. (2016) extend the static model of their 2010 work to explicitly model the role of investment in a dynamic framework. However, the dynamic version of the model has a heavier data and computational requirement, making its estimation for a large number of emerging market economies not feasible for this study.

  17. Sectors are aggregated along the lines of Eaton et al. (2010) with the exception that (i) mining and quarrying and (ii) coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel are stripped out from the residual services sector and used to quantify the commodities sector.

  18. In this Ricardian model of trade, trade in commodities occurs as a result of differences in the efficiency of production. This can be mapped to the real world – for example, oil importers have reservoirs deep underground and extraction is more inefficient than for oil exporters.

  19. The model does not feature any nominal rigidities or variations in the length of global value chains. This implies that observed fluctuations in trade flows due to these two factors will be imperfectly attributed to one of the four wedges. For example, the depreciation episodes of emerging market currencies appear to boost the trade cost wedge as trade values decline more than spending on domestic production in US dollars due to incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Similarly, changes in global value chain growth also tend to be absorbed by the trade cost wedge as exemplified by significant declines in measured trade costs for Vietnam.

  20. The trade deficit wedge played a negligible role during the recent trade slowdown. The productivity wedge exhibits some interesting dynamics, but they can be ascribed mostly to the recent supply-side-induced price changes in the commodity sector.

  21. The modified system of equations is available on request from the authors.

  22. Adding up the results under four counterfactual scenarios, each featuring a different wedge, does not necessarily yield the scenario containing all wedges at the same time. The wedges can amplify or dampen each other when they are present simultaneously, so that the sum of the fraction of the data they can account for individually can be greater or less than one.

  23. The 2017 outturns in terms of import growth and the evolution of the different output components already confirm some of our conclusions. Using the 2017 data that are now available at the time of revising the paper, the out-of-sample projection of import growth by of our country-specific reduced-form approach is 5.2%. This is very close to the actual (5.4%) aggregated import evolution during 2017. Moreover, in terms of output components, the higher imports in 2017 reflect mostly the 2017 rebound in investment as highlighted in our results.

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Correspondence to Emine Boz.

Additional information

We thank Oya Celasun, Julian di Giovanni, Caroline Freund, Andrei Levchenko, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Brent Neiman, Maury Obstfeld, and Walter Steingress, as well as two anonymous referees, participants in the BNM-IMF-IMFER Conference on Globalization After the Crisis, IMF Brown Bag seminar and the 2016 ECB-BoF Workshop organized by the I.R.C. Task Force on Global Trade for helpful comments and suggestions. Ava Yeabin Hong, Hao Jiang, Evgenia Pugacheva, Rachel Szymanski, and Hong Yang provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of IMF or IMF policy.

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Appendix: General Equilibrium Model

Appendix: General Equilibrium Model

This Appendix lays out the details of the structural model discussed in Section IV. The framework is the same as that developed by Eaton et al. (2010) except for the modeling of the commodities as a separate sector.

1.1 Sectors

There are four sectors: two manufacturing sectors broken down into durables and nondurables, commodities and a residual sector labeled as services. The commodities sector includes “mining and quarrying” and “coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel.” The residual sector comprises primarily services but also includes “agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing.” The sets of all sectors and tradable sectors are defined as \(\Omega = \{ Dr, N, C, S\}\) and \(\Omega _{T} = \left\{ {Dr, N, C} \right\}\), respectively, where Dr, N, C, and S denote the durable, nondurable manufacturing, commodities, and services sectors.

1.2 Gross Production, Absorption, and the Trade Balance

There are I countries indexed by i and sectors are indexed by j. Goods markets are perfectly competitive, and production is constant returns to scale. \(Y_{i}^{j}\) and \(X_{i}^{j}\) denote gross production and absorption, respectively, of country i in sector j. The difference between production and absorption yields the sectoral trade deficit, \(X_{i}^{j} - Y_{i}^{j} = D_{i}^{j}\), whose sum across all sectors yields the overall trade deficit of country i: \(\sum\nolimits_{{l \in\Omega }} {D_{i}^{j} = D_{i} }\). The world market clearing requires the sum of all countries’ deficits in each sector to sum to zero: \(\sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^{I} {D_{i}^{j} = 0}\). Output can be used as intermediate good in production or as final good. A Cobb–Douglas aggregator is used to aggregate sectoral inputs that enter production.

1.3 Input–Output Structure

Value-added in each sector is a share \(\beta_{i}^{j}\) of the sector’s gross output. The share of a sector l as an intermediate good in the production of sector j is denoted by \(\gamma_{i}^{jl}\) where \(\sum\nolimits_{{l \in\Omega }} {\gamma_{i}^{jl} = 1}\). Following Eaton et al. (2010), we assume both the value-added and intermediate input goods’ shares to be constant over time but variable across sectors and countries. Given the assumed input–output structure, the relationship between gross output and GDP is: \(\sum\nolimits_{{j \in\Omega }} {\beta_{i}^{j} Y_{i}^{j} = Y_{i} }\). GDP is also given by \(Y_{i} = X_{i} - D_{i}\) where \(X_{i}\) is absorption. Labor is mobile across sectors within a country. Denoting wages and labor as \(w_{i}\) and \(L_{i}\), respectively, GDP is also simply \(Y_{i} = \sum\nolimits_{{j \in\Omega }} {w_{i} L_{i}^{j} = w_{i} L_{i} }\) since investment and capital are not explicitly modeled.

1.4 Sectoral Demand

Total demand for a sector’s output is the sum of demand for final consumption and for use as an intermediate good. Denote \(\alpha_{i}^{j}\) the share of sector j consumption in country i’s final demand. Using the input–output structure introduced, the following condition characterizes sectoral demand:

$$X_{i}^{j} = \underbrace {{\alpha_{i}^{j} X_{i} }}_{\begin{subarray}{l} {\text{Final}} \\ {\text{demand}} \end{subarray} } + \underbrace {{\mathop \sum \limits_{{l \in\Omega }} \gamma_{i}^{lj} \left( {1 - \beta_{i}^{l} } \right)Y_{i}^{l} }}_{\begin{subarray}{l} {\text{Intermediate}} \\ {\text{input}}\;{\text{demand}} \end{subarray} },$$

where the second term on the right-hand-side sums the use of sector j output as intermediate inputs across all sectors. Since trade in sector S is not explicitly modeled, the services sector can be “folded in” after some algebra, and the sectoral demand equations can be reduced to three, one for each traded sector:

$$X_{i}^{j} = \tilde{\alpha }_{i}^{j} \left( {w_{i} L_{i} + D_{i} } \right) - \delta_{i}^{j} D_{i}^{s} + \mathop \sum \limits_{{l \in\Omega _{T} }} \tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{lj} \left( {1 - \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{l} } \right)Y_{i}^{l}$$

In this formulation, the input–output parameters have been redefined and renormalized as \(\delta_{i}^{j} = \frac{{\gamma_{i}^{Sj} \left( {1 - \beta_{i}^{S} } \right)}}{{1 - \gamma_{i}^{SS} (1 - \beta_{i}^{S} )}}\), \(\tilde{\alpha }_{i}^{j} = \alpha_{i}^{j} + \delta_{i}^{j} \alpha_{i}^{S}\), \(\tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} = \beta_{i}^{j} + \frac{{\gamma_{i}^{jS} \left( {1 - \beta_{i}^{j} } \right)\beta_{i}^{S} }}{{1 - \gamma_{i}^{SS} (1 - \beta_{i}^{S} )}}\), \(\tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{jl} = \gamma_{i}^{jl} + \gamma_{i}^{jS} \frac{{\gamma_{i}^{jS} \left( {1 - \beta_{i}^{j} } \right)\beta_{i}^{S} + \gamma_{i}^{jl} \beta_{i}^{S} }}{{1 - \gamma_{i}^{SS} (1 - \beta_{i}^{S} ) - \gamma_{i}^{jS} \beta_{i}^{S} }}\) and \(\mathop \sum \limits_{{l \in\Omega _{\text{T}} }} \tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{jl} = 1 .\).

1.5 Technology

The production structure follows Eaton and Kortum (2002) in that each sector comprises a continuum of goods indexed z, which are produced with an efficiency of \(a_{i}^{j} (z)\). As standard in this type of models, \(a_{i}^{j} (z)\) is a random variable with a country- and sector-specific Fréchet distribution specified as \(F_{i}^{j} (a) = \Pr \left[ {a_{i}^{j} \left( z \right) \le a} \right] = e^{{ - T_{i}^{j} a^{ - \theta } }}\). \(T_{i}^{j}\) governs the location of the distribution, i.e., country i’s overall efficiency in sector j. \(\theta\) controls the dispersion of efficiencies within the distribution and thus the strength of comparative advantage.

1.6 Prices and Trade Costs

Denoting the input cost, which includes the cost of labor and intermediate goods, with \(c_{i}^{j}\), and the constant returns to scale assumption, the cost of producing a unit of good z is \(c_{i}^{j} /a_{i}^{j} (z)\). Trade is subject to standard iceberg costs, \(d_{ni}^{j}\). Therefore, the price offered by country i of good z in county n is: \(p_{ni}^{j} \left( z \right) = c_{i}^{j} d_{ni}^{j} /a_{i}^{j} (z)\). Countries shop around for the lowest price supplier, and thus, the price actually paid for good z is the minimum of the prices offered by potential trading partners, i.e., \(p_{n}^{j} \left( z \right) = \mathop {\hbox{min} }\limits_{i} \left\{ {p_{ni}^{j} (z)} \right\}\).

Taking prices as given, buyers maximize a CES objective function with an elasticity parameter of \(\sigma^{j}\) subject to their budget constraints. Utilizing the properties of the efficiency distribution and the CES objective function, sectoral prices can be written as, where \(\varphi^{j}\) a function of \(\sigma^{j}\) and \(\theta\):

$$p_{n}^{j} = \varphi^{j} \left[ {\mathop \sum \limits_{i = 1}^{I} T_{i}^{j} \left( {c_{i}^{j} d_{ni}^{j} } \right)^{ - \theta } } \right]^{ - 1/\theta } .$$

Noting that the cost can be written as \(c_{i}^{j} = \frac{1}{{A_{i}^{jS} }}w_{i}^{{\tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} }} \mathop \prod \limits_{{l \in\Omega _{T} }} \left( {p_{i}^{l} } \right)^{{\gamma_{i}^{jl} \left( {1 - \beta_{i}^{j} } \right)}}\) to take into account the cost of labor and intermediate inputs, and substituting it in the sectoral price equation above yields:

$$p_{n}^{j} = \varphi^{j} \left[ {\mathop \sum \limits_{i = 1}^{I} \left( {w_{i}^{{\tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} }} \left( {\mathop \prod \limits_{{l \in\Omega _{T} }} \left( {p_{i}^{l} } \right)^{{\tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{jl} \left( {1 - \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} } \right)}} } \right)\frac{{d_{ni}^{j} }}{{A_{i}^{j} }}} \right)^{ - \theta } } \right]^{{ - \frac{1}{\theta }}} .$$

1.7 Trade Shares

Define \(\pi_{ni}^{j}\) as the share of country n’s expenditures on sector j goods imported from country i. Total demand for country i’s sector j goods summed across all importers add up to its output:

$$Y_{i}^{j} = \mathop \sum \limits_{n = 1}^{I} \pi_{ni}^{j} X_{n}^{j} .$$

As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), trade shares can be written as

$$\pi_{ni}^{j} = \frac{{T_{i}^{j} \left[ {c_{i}^{j} d_{ni}^{j} } \right]^{ - \theta } }}{{\mathop \sum \nolimits_{k = 1}^{I} T_{k}^{j} \left[ {c_{k}^{j} d_{nk}^{j} } \right]^{ - \theta } }}.$$

Substituting in the expressions for input costs and sectoral prices above yields:

$$\pi_{ni}^{j} = \left[ {w_{i}^{{\tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} }} \left( {\mathop \prod \limits_{{l \in\Omega _{T} }} \left( {p_{i}^{l} } \right)^{{\tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{jl} \left( {1 - \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} } \right)}} } \right)\frac{{\varphi^{j} d_{ni}^{j} }}{{A_{i}^{j} p_{n}^{j} }}} \right]^{ - \theta } .$$

1.8 Market Clearing

The market clearing conditions equalize country \(i\)’s gross output (on the left) to global spending on this county’s tradable output (on the right).

$$Y_{i}^{Dr} + Y_{i}^{N} + Y_{i}^{C} = \mathop \sum \limits_{{l \in \varOmega_{T} }} \mathop \sum \limits_{n = 1}^{I} \pi_{ni}^{l} X_{n}^{l}$$

Substituting the expression for the trade shares in the sectoral demand function yields:

$$X_{i}^{j} = \tilde{\alpha }_{i}^{j} \left( {w_{i} L_{i} + D_{i} } \right) - \delta_{i}^{j} D_{i}^{S} + \mathop \sum \limits_{{l \in \varOmega_{T} }} \tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{lj} \left( {1 - \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{l} } \right)\left( {\mathop \sum \limits_{n = 1}^{I} \pi_{ni}^{l} X_{n}^{l} } \right)$$

Labor supply is fixed, so labor market clearing requires \(L_{i} = \bar{L}\).

1.9 Solving for the Counterfactual Scenarios

As described in the main text, the solution procedure utilizes the “exact hat algebra” a la Dekle et al. (2007). Denoting changes using “hat”s and next period or counterfactual values using “prime”s, where \(\hat{x} = x^{{\prime }} /x,\) key equations that pin down the model’s equilibrium for a given set of wedges can be rewritten as follows.

Market clearing:

$$\left( {X_{i}^{Dr} } \right)^{\prime } + \left( {X_{i}^{N} } \right)^{\prime } + \left( {X_{i}^{C} } \right)^{\prime } - \left[ {D_{i}^{\prime } - \left( {D_{i}^{S} } \right)^{\prime } } \right] = \mathop \sum \limits_{n = 1}^{I} \left( {\pi_{ni}^{Dr} } \right)^{\prime } \left( {X_{n}^{Dr} } \right)^{\prime } + \mathop \sum \limits_{n = 1}^{I} \left( {\pi_{ni}^{N} } \right)^{\prime } \left( {X_{n}^{N} } \right)^{\prime } + \mathop \sum \limits_{n = 1}^{I} \left( {\pi_{ni}^{C} } \right)^{\prime } \left( {X_{n}^{C} } \right)^{\prime }$$

Sectoral demand (noting that \(Y_{i}^{{\prime }} = \hat{w}_{i} Y_{i}\) given fixed labor supply):

$$\left( {X_{i}^{j} } \right)^{\prime } = \left( {\tilde{\alpha }_{i}^{j} } \right)^{\prime } \left( {\hat{w}_{i} Y_{i} + D_{i}^{\prime } } \right) - \delta_{i}^{j} \left( { D_{i}^{S} } \right)^{\prime } + \mathop \sum \limits_{{l \in \varOmega_{T} }} \tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{lj} \left( {1 - \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{l} } \right)\left[ {\mathop \sum \limits_{n = 1}^{I} \left( {\pi_{ni}^{l} } \right)^{\prime } \left( {X_{n}^{l} } \right)^{\prime } } \right]$$

Sectoral price:

$$\hat{p}_{n}^{j} = \left( {\mathop \sum \limits_{i = 1}^{I} \pi_{ni}^{j} \hat{w}_{i}^{{ - \tilde{\theta } \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} }} \left( {\mathop \prod \limits_{{l \in \varOmega_{T} }} \left( {\hat{p}_{i}^{l} } \right)^{{ - \theta \tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{jl} \left( {1 - \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} } \right)}} } \right)\left( {\frac{{\hat{d}_{ni}^{j} }}{{\hat{A}_{i}^{j} }}} \right)^{ - \theta } } \right)^{ - 1/\theta }$$

Trade shares:

$$\left( {\pi_{ni}^{j} } \right)^{\prime } = \pi_{ni}^{j} \hat{w}_{i}^{{ - \tilde{\theta }\tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} }} \left( {\mathop \prod \limits_{{l \in \varOmega_{T} }} \left( {\hat{p}_{i}^{l} } \right)^{{ - \theta \tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{jl} \left( {1 - \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} } \right)}} } \right)\left( {\frac{{\hat{d}_{ni}^{j} }}{{\hat{A}_{i}^{j} \hat{p}_{n}^{j} }}} \right)^{ - \theta }$$

The four equations above constitute a system of nonlinear equations with four sets of unknowns: wage changes, price changes, counterfactual or end-of-period sectoral demand, and trade shares. The solution procedure starts with a conjecture for wage changes. It then solves for prices changes by iterating on the sectoral price equation above. Conjectured wage changes and price changes consistent with the wage change conjecture are plugged in the trade share equation to obtain counterfactual trade shares, which are subsequently used to compute sectoral prices. Finally, the procedure checks whether the market clearing condition holds and updates the wage conjecture accordingly. If the market clearing is satisfied up to a low numerical error threshold, the procedure stops.

1.10 Obtaining the Wedges

The sectoral demand equation using matrix notation is:

$${\mathbf{X}}_{i} = {\mathbf{Y}}_{i} + {\mathbf{D}}_{i} = {\varvec{\upalpha}}_{i} X_{i} + {\varvec{\Gamma}}_{i}^{T} {\mathbf{Y}}_{i}$$

where \({\varvec{\Gamma}}_{i}\) is a matrix with \(\gamma_{i}^{lj} \left( {1 - \beta_{i}^{l} } \right)\) in the lth row and jth column and the sectors are ordered as Dr, N, C, and S. Demand composition wedges can then be calculated by substituting in the empirical counterparts of the right-hand-side variables in the following equation:

$${\varvec{\upalpha}}_{i} = \frac{1}{{X_{i} }}\left( {{\mathbf{X}}_{i} - {\varvec{\Gamma}}_{i}^{T} {\mathbf{Y}}_{i} } \right),$$

Trade deficit wedges, \(D_{i}^{j}\), are exogenous and simply fed from the data.

Changes in trade cost wedges are obtained using data on bilateral trade shares and sectoral prices, and the standard gravity equation in changes: \(\left( {\hat{d}_{ni}^{j} } \right)^{ - \theta } = \frac{{\hat{\pi }_{ni}^{j} }}{{\hat{\pi }_{ii}^{j} }}\left( {\frac{{\hat{p}_{i}^{j} }}{{\hat{p}_{n}^{j} }}} \right)^{\theta }\). The condition to back out changes in the productivity wedges can be derived by rearranging the above equation that characterizes the changes in trade shares:

$$\hat{A}_{i}^{j} = \left( {\hat{\pi }_{ii}^{j} } \right)^{1/\theta } \hat{w}_{i}^{{\tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} }} \left( {\hat{p}_{i}^{j} } \right)^{{\tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{jj} \left( {1 - \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} } \right) - 1 }} \mathop \prod \limits_{{l \in \varOmega_{T} , l \ne j }} \left( {\hat{p}_{i}^{l} } \right)^{{\tilde{\gamma }_{i}^{jl} \left( {1 - \tilde{\beta }_{i}^{j} } \right)}} .$$

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Aslam, A., Boz, E., Cerutti, E. et al. The Slowdown in Global Trade: A Symptom of a Weak Recovery?. IMF Econ Rev 66, 440–479 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-018-0063-7

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