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Eastern Economic Journal

, Volume 45, Issue 2, pp 161–178 | Cite as

Retaliatory Antidumping by China: A New Look at the Evidence

  • Thomas OsangEmail author
  • Jaden Warren
Original Article
  • 18 Downloads

Abstract

China is the most frequent target of antidumping (AD) filings and the sixth most frequent user of antidumping duties. In this paper, we investigate the factors that influence China’s decision to retaliate using AD filings from 1995 to 2015. We consider an AD filing by China to be retaliatory if it occurs within 1 year of an initial AD filing against them and determine the factors that explain retaliatory antidumping filings. We find that higher levels of China’s country-specific imports, lower growth rates of Chinese GDP, and China’s WTO membership increase the likelihood of retaliation. In contrast, higher import growth reduces AD retaliation.

Keywords

Antidumping Retaliation Trade China WTO 

JEL Classification

F1 F13 F14 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Richard Nugent, Maurizio Zanardi, an anonymous referee, as well as seminar participants at the Eastern Economic Association meetings and the Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade conference for useful comments and suggestions.

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Copyright information

© EEA 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSouthern Methodist UniversityDallasUSA
  2. 2.University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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