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Exploring the Social-Architecture Model

  • Alan G. IsaacEmail author
Original Article
  • 25 Downloads

Abstract

Microfoundations proposed for macroeconomics often include strong counterfactual assumptions about the knowledge and foresight of agents and about the pervasiveness of equilibrium exchange. This paper explores and improves the social-architecture model, an agent-based macromodel that discards such assumptions. In this monetary exchange economy, individuals transact at disequilibrium prices in shopping-based goods markets and search-based labor markets. GDP and unemployment distributions are emergent outcomes of the individual-level interactions. These distributions expose some problems in the original model. Modest model amendments largely address these problems. Some apparently central ingredients of the model prove to have little influence on the simulation results.

Keywords

Agent-based macroeconomics Microfoundations Behavioral agnosticism 

JEL Classification

E03 C6 B5 

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Copyright information

© EEA 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsAmerican UniversityWashingtonUSA

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