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Who appropriates centrality rents? The role of institutions in regulating social networks in the global Islamic finance industry

  • Remzi Gözübüyük
  • Carl Joachim Kock
  • Murat Ünal
Article

Abstract

This study explains and tests the effects of country-level institutions on the distribution of centrality rents between two sets of actors in an interorganizational network. Building on the literature on corporate elites, we propose that a cohesive elite following organizational logics other than profit-maximization diverts centrality rents and induces costs on firms, and that macro institutions act as external governance mechanisms to shape this relationship. We develop our theory in the emerging Islamic finance industry, where “Shariah scholars” connect firms and constitute a religious corporate elite. While central scholars in this network create legitimacy for firms, they also shirk and cause information leakage, suggesting a negative centrality-performance relationship for the firms. Country-level institutions such as government regulation and democracy, we argue, ameliorate these effects by influencing this religious elite’s institutional logic and restraining their actions, while institutions developed from within the industry strengthen the power of the elite. Testing our theory in a network of 367 scholars and 396 institutions over 31 countries using multi-level methods, we indeed find a negative centrality-performance relationship that is ameliorated by stronger government regulation but exacerbated by better-developed industry-specific institutions, as well as a negative relationship between democratic and regulatory institutions and centrality.

Keywords

network theory institutional environment firm performance corporate governance networks emerging markets multi-level analysis 

Résumé

Cette étude explique et teste les effets des institutions nationales sur la répartition des rentes de centralité entre deux groupes d’acteurs dans un réseau inter-organisationnel. En s’appuyant sur la littérature sur les élites managériales, nous proposons qu’une élite cohésive - suivant des logiques organisationnelles autres que la maximisation du profit - détourne les rentes de centralité et induit des coûts pour les entreprises, et que les macro-institutions agissent comme des mécanismes de gouvernance externe pour façonner cette relation. Nous développons notre théorie dans l’industrie émergente de la finance islamique, où les « chercheurs académiques de la charia » relient les entreprises et constituent une élite managériale religieuse. Bien que les chercheurs académiques clés de ce réseau créent une légitimité pour les entreprises, ils se dérobent et causent des fuites d’informations, ce qui suggère pour les entreprises une relation négative entre la centralité et la performance. Nous considérons que les institutions nationales, telles que la réglementation gouvernementale et la démocratie, améliorent ces effets en influençant la logique institutionnelle de cette élite religieuse et en limitant leurs actions, tandis que les institutions développées au sein de l’industrie renforcent le pouvoir de l’élite. En testant notre théorie dans un réseau de 367 chercheurs académiques et 396 établissements répartis dans 31 pays à l’aide de méthodes à plusieurs niveaux, nous constatons en effet une relation négative entre la centralité et la performance qui est améliorée par une réglementation gouvernementale plus stricte - mais exacerbée par des institutions sectorielles mieux développées - ainsi qu’une relation négative entre la centralité et les institutions démocratiques et réglementaires.

Resumen

Este estudio explica y prueba los efectos de las instituciones a nivel país en la distribución de las rentas de centralidad entre dos grupos de actores en una red interorganizacional. Sobre la base de la literatura sobre élites corporativas, proponemos que una élite cohesiva que sigue lógicas organizacionales distintas de la maximización de la ganancia desvíe las rentas de centralidad e induzca costos en las empresas, y las instituciones macro actúan como mecanismos de gobernanza externa para dar forma a esta relación. Desarrollamos nuestra teoría en la emergente industria financiera Islámica, donde los “estudiosos de la Sharia” conectan las empresas y constituyen una élite corporativa religiosa. Si bien los académicos centrales en esta red crean legitimidad para las empresas, también eluden y crean fugas de información, lo que sugiere una relación de centralidad y rendimiento negativa para las empresas. Las instituciones a nivel país como la regulación gubernamental y la democracia, argumentamos, mejoran estos efectos al influir en la lógica institucional de las élites religiosas y restringir sus acciones, mientras que las instituciones desarrolladas desde dentro de la industria fortalecen el poder de la élite. Al probar nuestra teoría en una red de 367 académicos y 396 instituciones en 31 países usando métodos multinivel, encontramos una relación negativa de centralidad-rendimiento que se ve mejorada por una regulación gubernamental más fuerte, pero también exacerbada por instituciones de la industria mejor desarrolladas, también como una relación negativa entre instituciones democráticas y regulatorias y la centralidad.

Resumo

Este estudo explica e testa os efeitos de instituições ao nível de país na distribuição de rendas de centralidade entre dois conjuntos de atores em uma rede interorganizacional. Com base na literatura sobre elites corporativas, propomos que uma elite coesa seguindo lógicas organizacionais que não a maximização do lucro desvia rendas de centralidade e induz custos nas empresas, e que as macroinstituições agem como mecanismos externos de governança para moldar essa relação. Desenvolvemos nossa teoria na emergente indústria financeira islâmica, onde “estudiosos da Sharia” conectam empresas e constituem uma elite corporativa religiosa. Enquanto acadêmicos centrais dessa rede criam legitimidade para as empresas, eles também se esquivam e vazam informações, sugerindo uma relação negativa de centralidade-desempenho para as empresas. Instituições ao nível de país, como regulamentação governamental e democracia, argumentamos, aprimoram esses efeitos influenciando a lógica institucional dessa elite religiosa e restringindo suas ações, enquanto instituições desenvolvidas dentro da indústria fortalecem o poder da elite. Testando nossa teoria em uma rede de 367 acadêmicos e 396 instituições de mais de 31 países usando métodos multinível, nós de fato encontramos uma relação negativa de centralidade-desempenho que é melhorada por uma regulação governamental mais forte, mas exacerbada por instituições setoriais mais desenvolvidas, bem como uma relação negativa entre instituições democráticas e regulatórias e centralidade.

摘要

本研究解释并测试了国家层面制度对组织间网络中两组参与者之间的中央租金分配的影响。在关于企业精英的文献基础上,我们提出,除了利润最大化之外,遵循组织逻辑的有凝聚力的精英会转移中央租金并诱导企业成本,并且宏观制度作为外部治理机制塑造这种关系。我们在新兴伊斯兰金融业开发我们的理论,其中“伊斯兰教法学者”连接公司并组成宗教企业精英。虽然这个网络中的核心学者为公司创造了合法性,但他们也推卸责任并导致信息泄露,表明了公司负面的中央-绩效关系。我们认为,政府监管和民主等国家层面的制度通过影响这些宗教精英的制度逻辑并限制其行动来改善这些影响,而从行业内发展起来的制度则加强了精英的力量。我们利用多层次方法在31个国家的367名学者和396个制度的网络中测试我们的理论,我们确实发现了一种负面的中央-绩效关系,这种关系可以通过更强有力的政府监管得到改善,但也可以通过更发达的行业特定制度加剧,同时也发现了民主和监管制度与中央之间的负面关系。

Notes

Acknowledgements

We thank our editor, Gokhan Ertug, and the anonymous reviewers for their guidance during the review process. We are also thankful for the comments and suggestions of Mehmet E. Genç, Beyza Polat, and seminar participants at Sabanci University.

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Copyright information

© Academy of International Business 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Remzi Gözübüyük
    • 1
  • Carl Joachim Kock
    • 2
  • Murat Ünal
    • 3
  1. 1.Sabanci School of ManagementSabanci UniversityTuzlaTurkey
  2. 2.IE Business SchoolMadridSpain
  3. 3.SONEAN GmbHKronbergGermany

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