Abstract
In response to Kratochwil's focus on the problem of theory-building in international relations (IR), I argue, first, that history (or historical ways of asking/answering questions) is essential to IR, but that, once this is accepted, a host of questions regarding the nature and function of historical knowledge-claims must be incorporated into meta-IR investigations of the kind Kratochwil and others have engaged in predominantly from the perspective of the philosophy of science. Second, I accept Kratochwil's main thesis that the failure of foundationalism does not lead us to nihilism or relativism but point out that there is an easier way to express this thesis via Kuhn's later treatment of theory choice in science. Third, I briefly point to a number of uncertainties regarding Kratochwil's plea for pragmatism in IR theory-building.
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Notes
See Suganami (2006) for a detailed discussion of these points.
See Linklater and Suganami (2006) for a detailed exposition of the key contentions of the English School.
Hollis and Smith (1990) is a good example of this tendency. According to them, IR should avoid ‘collapsing into a fragmented Diplomatic History which lacks all rhyme and reason’ (1990: 194).
See, however, my discussion, towards the end of this contribution, of Kratochwil's important acknowledgement of this historicity of theory.
For Clausewitz (1976: 89), the phenomenon of war was ‘a remarkable trinity’ — of blind natural force, the play of chance, and subordination to reason as an instrument of policy.
Historical comprehension — or ‘com-prehension’ as Paul Ricouer reminds us (1984: 76) — is grasping together of a given set of events and/or actions, conceived of as an intelligible whole, or a not-so-unintelligible whole.
Ankersmit (1986) stresses the constructed and opaque nature of historical narratives. Fasolt (2004) persuasively demonstrates the intrinsically political nature of historical representations. Mink (1978) points to the linear narrative as a distinct mode of understanding while Veyne (1984) stresses the importance of plot as a mode of comprehension. White (1973, 1978, 1987) discusses many issues relating to the politics of historical representation in considerable depth. None of the works cited here, however, deals with the series of questions listed in the text in a comprehensive manner.
Newton-Smith (1981) offered a realist defence of the rationality of science in his attempt to fill the lacuna.
References
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Suganami, H. Friedrich Kratochwil's pragmatic search for a theory of international relations. J Int Relat Dev 10, 25–39 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800112
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800112