Journal of International Business Studies

, Volume 39, Issue 5, pp 833–850 | Cite as

Top executive pay and firm performance in China

Article
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Abstract

The sensitivity of executive pay to share price performance has been the main focus of Western executive pay studies, reflecting shareholders’ efforts to reduce agency problems by better aligning the rewards of executives with their own. However, these studies have ignored motivational effects and possible two-way pay–performance causation. This paper reports Chinese executive pay–performance sensitivity, with international comparisons, to examine whether China's unique institutional environment has produced outcomes consistent with those for Western market economies. This same unique environment makes possible the first estimates of two-way causation based on panel data analysis. The results show that executive pay and firm performance mutually affect each other through both reward and motivation.

Keywords

executive pay causation China 
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Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to four anonymous reviewers and a Departmental Editor for their comments.

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Copyright information

© Academy of International Business 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Business School, Loughborough UniversityLoughboroughUK
  2. 2.Business School, Nottingham UniversityNottinghamUK

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