International Politics

, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 415–429 | Cite as

American Interests and IMF Lending

  • Thomas Oatley
  • Jason Yackee
Article

Abstract

Does the United States shape the content of International Monetary Fund conditionality agreements? If so, in pursuit of what goals does the United States use its influence? We present evidence that American interests do shape the content of IMF conditionality agreements. We find that American policymakers use their influence in the IMF to pursue American financial and foreign policy objectives. The IMF offers larger loans to countries heavily indebted to American commercial banks than to other countries. In addition, the IMF offers larger loans to governments closely allied to the United States.

Keywords

IMF conditionality United States 

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Oatley
    • 1
  • Jason Yackee
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel HillUSA

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