Comparative Economic Studies

, Volume 46, Issue 3, pp 451–467

Adoption, Implementation and Impact of IMF Programmes: A Review of the Issues and Evidence

  • Joseph P Joyce
Regular Article

Abstract

This paper evaluates the literature on the lending programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The first section deals with the initiation of a Fund program, which has been shown to be influenced by political and institutional variables. A second focus of research analyses the design and implementation of Fund-supported polices, since many programmes are often not successfully completed. The third issue surveyed is the impact of IMF policies on the economy of the borrowing government. The effect of Fund programmes on private capital flows is also examined.

Keywords

IMF programmes Conditionality 

JEL Classifications

F3 O1 

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Copyright information

© Association for Comparative Economic Studies (ACES) 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph P Joyce
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsWellesley CollegeWellesleyUSA

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