Journal of Public Health Policy

, Volume 37, Issue 2, pp 149–159 | Cite as

Unhealthy marketing of pharmaceutical products: An international public health concern

  • Shai Mulinari


I consider the current state of pharmaceutical marketing vis-à-vis ethical and legal standards and advocate measures to improve it. There is abundant evidence of unethical or illicit marketing. It fuels growing concerns about undue corporate influence over pharmaceutical research, education, and consumption. The most extensive evidence of industry transgressions comes from the United States (US), where whistle-blowers are encouraged by financial rewards to help uncover illicit marketing and fraud. Outside the US increasing evidence of transgressions exists. Recently I have observed a range of new measures to align pharmaceutical marketing practices with ethical and legal standards. In the interest of public health, I highlight the need for additional and more profound reforms to ensure that information about medicines supports quality and resource-efficient care.


pharmaceutical industry marketing promotion regulation public health 

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shai Mulinari
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of SociologyLund UniversityLundSweden

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