Journal of the Operational Research Society

, Volume 62, Issue 4, pp 565–580

Survey of cooperative inventory games and extensions

General Paper


We examine cooperative games in supply-chain management termed Inventory Games. Supply-chain management has non-cooperative and cooperative interactions between the participating players. We provide a concise survey of cooperative inventory games in the form of extensions on two basic problems. For deterministic games, Economic Order Quantity-like policies with joint replenishment are of primary interest. For stochastic games we examine Newsvendor-like centralization games and their extensions. We conclude with a short summary of a dynamic Newsvendor realization game and directions for further research.


cooperative games inventory games production games 


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Copyright information

© Operational Research Society 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Eller College of Management, The University of ArizonaUSA
  2. 2.California State University MaritimeCaliforniaUSA
  3. 3.College of Economics and BusinessUSA

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