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Journal of International Business Studies

, Volume 42, Issue 3, pp 406–426 | Cite as

Related lending and banking development

  • Robert CullEmail author
  • Stephen Haber
  • Masami Imai
Article

Abstract

Does related lending have positive or negative effects on the development of banking systems? We analyze a unique cross-country data set covering 74 countries from 1990 to 2007, and find that related lending, on average, does not have any effect on the growth of credit. We do find, however, that there are conditional relationships: related lending tends to retard the growth of banking systems when rule of law is weak, whereas it tends to promote the growth of banking systems when rule of law is strong. We also find that related lending appears to be associated with looting when banks are owned by non-financial firms, but that it does not do so when non-financial firms are owned by banks. Our results indicate that whether related lending is positive or pernicious depends critically on the institutional context in which it takes place; there is no single “best policy” regarding related lending. These findings are robust to alternative specifications, including IV regressions.

Keywords

financial and industrial structure banking and finance institutional environment markets and institutions 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The views are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the World Bank or its affiliate institutions. Imai gratefully acknowledges financial support from Wesleyan University for a Mellon Faculty Career Development Mini Grant. We thank Varun Kshirsagar and Yeon Soo Kim for their excellent research assistance, and Thorsten Beck, Richard Grossman, Lewis Davis, Aldo Musacchio and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Harvard Business School International Research Conference, the 3rd Annual Workshop in Macroeconomics in Liberal Arts Colleges, and the Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas. All errors are our own.

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Copyright information

© Academy of International Business 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Development Research Group, World BankWashingtonUSA
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceStanford UniversityStanfordUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsWesleyan UniversityMiddletownUSA

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