Interest Groups & Advocacy

, Volume 2, Issue 1, pp 48–70 | Cite as

Timing is everything? Organized interests and the timing of legislative activity

  • Dimiter ToshkovEmail author
  • David Lowery
  • Brendan Carroll
  • Joost Berkhout
Original Article

Executive Summary

Different perspectives on the role of organized interests in democratic politics imply different temporal sequences in the relationship between legislative activity and the influence activities of organized interests. Unfortunately, lack of data has greatly limited any kind of detailed examination of this temporal relationship. We address this problem by taking advantage of the chronologically very precise data on lobbying activity provided by the door pass system of the European Parliament and data on EU legislative activity collected from EURLEX. After reviewing the several different theoretical perspectives on the timing of lobbying and legislative activity, we present a time series analysis of the co-evolution of legislative output and interest groups for the period 2005–2011. Our findings show that, contrary to what pluralist and neo-corporatist theories propose, interest groups neither lead nor lag bursts in legislative activity in the European Union.


EU governance interest group mobilization legislative output legislative production lobbying time series analysis 


Supplementary material

41309_2013_BFiga201214_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (53 kb)
Online Appendix Tables A1–A3


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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dimiter Toshkov
    • 1
    Email author
  • David Lowery
    • 1
  • Brendan Carroll
    • 1
  • Joost Berkhout
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Public AdministrationLeiden UniversityLeidenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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