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The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review

, Volume 39, Issue 2, pp 136–152 | Cite as

New Developments in the Theory of Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance

  • Wanda Mimra
  • Achim Wambach
Article

Abstract

We provide an overview of the paths taken to understand existence and efficiency of equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). A stream of recent work reconsiders the strategic foundations of competitive equilibrium by carefully modelling the market game.

Keywords

adverse selection competitive insurance market equilibrium existence 

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Copyright information

© The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wanda Mimra
    • 1
  • Achim Wambach
    • 2
  1. 1.Center of Economic Research, ETH ZurichZuerichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsStaatswissenschaftliches Seminar, University of CologneCologneGermany

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