French Politics

, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 97–119

Assets and risk: A neglected dimension of economic voting

  • Richard Nadeau
  • Martial Foucault
  • Michael S Lewis-Beck
Research Article

DOI: 10.1057/fp.2011.5

Cite this article as:
Nadeau, R., Foucault, M. & Lewis-Beck, M. Fr Polit (2011) 9: 97. doi:10.1057/fp.2011.5

Abstract

Economic voting studies have been dominated by the classic reward–punishment paradigm, in which voters vote for the incumbent under good economic performance, but against under bad. This paradigm works well when the economic issue is a valence issue, such as prosperity. However, it leaves out positional economic voting, in which the voter's place in the economic structure influences policy preference, and thus party preference. More precisely, we suggest that the better the economic location of voters in terms of assets, high-risk assets in particular, the more they will vote right, because the right promises a better return on their investments. We demonstrate this effect in French presidential election data, from three national surveys – 1988, 1995 and 2002. This assets effect well exceeds other economic effects tested, and does so under strong statistical controls.

Keywords

voting behavior economic voting France presidential elections assets and risk 

Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard Nadeau
    • 1
  • Martial Foucault
    • 1
  • Michael S Lewis-Beck
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of MontréalMontréalCanada
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of IowaIowa CityUSA

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