French Politics

, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 158–181 | Cite as

C’est en forgeant qu'on devient forgeron? Assessing legislative productivity in Fifth Republic France

  • Richard S Conley
Data, Measures and Methods

Abstract

This exploratory research note theorises about and tests the factors that have affected legislative productivity in France from 1960 to 2007. The empirical model accounts for intra-parliamentary dynamics such as the parties’ ideological placement on a left-right scale, the government's seat strength, coalition governments and intensity of opposition to the majority in the National Assembly. The model also considers features unique to the Fifth Republic, such as judicial review of bills by the Constitutional Council and presidents’ ‘sacking’ of prime ministers. External factors include strikes and social movements, as well as prime ministers’ and presidents’ job approval that are posited to impact lawmaking. The results of the analysis suggest how the model developed in this research may be extended to future analyses of parliamentary activity in the Fifth Republic.

Keywords

France Fifth Republic National Assembly lawmaking cohabitation Mots clés 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for research support from the University of Florida Paris Research Center, as well as the helpful assistance of staff at the Institut d’Études Politiques in Paris, France, and the Institut d’Études Politiques and Université d’Aix-Marseille III in Aix-en-Provence, France.

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard S Conley
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of FloridaGainesvilleUSA

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