Contemporary Political Theory

, Volume 8, Issue 2, pp 152–175 | Cite as

Facts and values in politics and Searle's Construction of Social Reality

  • David Jason Karp
Original Article
First Online:
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Accepted:

Abstract

Contemporary political theory is fractured in its account of ontology and methods. One prominent fault line is between empirical and normative theory – the former usually called ‘philosophy of social science’, or ‘social-science methodology’, and not ‘theory’ at all. A second fault line exists between analytical and post-modern (or ‘late-modern’) political theory. These fractures prevent political researchers who engage with the same substantive issues, such as the right of same-sex couples to marry, from speaking to one another in a common language. This paper's first section discusses the history of the fact-value divide in political studies: a history that led to the contemporary state of the discipline. The second section argues that Searle's philosophy provides tools that can bridge this divide. The third section raises normative objections that limit the extent to which one can accept Searle's theory as a fully general account of social and political reality. Although limited in scope, Searle's argument should be welcomed as an attempt to provide a common set of important tools for political researchers on all sides of these debates.

Keywords

Searle facts and values constructivism social reality philosophy of social science Rawls 
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Notes

Acknowledgements

This paper benefited immensely from comments and criticisms provided by the following people: Saladin Meckled-Garcia, Alex Brown, Laura Valentini, Julio Montero, James McKee, Jock Gunn and two anonymous referees. This paper was presented at the PhD Workshop in Political Theory at UCL on Wednesday 16 January 2008; many thanks to all of the participants who attended this workshop.

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Jason Karp
    • 1
  1. 1.University College LondonLondonUK

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