Rewards and punishments can cajole people into cooperating, but they are costly to implement. A theoretical study finds that, when participation in group activities is optional, punishing uncooperative behaviour is the cheaper method.
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Gächter, S. Carrot or stick?. Nature 483, 39–40 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1038/483039a
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/483039a
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