Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Computing

The security of knowing nothing

  • News & Views
  • Published:

From Nature

View current issue Submit your manuscript

A Correction to this article was published on 02 May 2007

'Zero-knowledge' proofs are all about knowing more, while knowing nothing. When married to cryptographic techniques, they are one avenue being explored towards improving the security of online transactions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Figure 1: Tube tour.

References

  1. Goldreich, O., Micali, S. & Wigderson, A. Proc. 19th ACM Symp. Theor. Comput. 218–229 (1987).

  2. Barak, B. & Sahai, A. Proc. 46th IEEE Symp. Fut. Comput. Sci. 543–552 (2005).

  3. Goldwasser, S., Micali, S. & Rackoff, C. SIAM J. Comput. 18, 186–208 (1989).

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  4. Goldreich, O. Foundations of Cryptography (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  5. Goldreich, O., Micali, S. & Wigderson, A. J. Ass. Comput. Machin. 38, 691–729 (1991).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bernard Chazelle is in the Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, 35 Olden Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540-5233, USA. chazelle@cs.princeton.edu,

    Bernard Chazelle

Authors
  1. Bernard Chazelle
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Chazelle, B. The security of knowing nothing. Nature 446, 992–993 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1038/446992a

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/446992a

  • Springer Nature Limited

This article is cited by

Search

Navigation