Abstract
Whereas early threats are chosen before bargaining, late threats are determined after bargaining ended in conflict. Instead of exogenously imposing the timing of threats, these are derived endogenously as in indirect evolution or endogenous timing. Based on a duopoly market, we first derive the equilibrium for all possible constellations regarding the timing of threats. Our analysis surprisingly justifies the early timing of threats as suggested by Nash (1953).
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Berninghaus, S.K., Guth, W. Now or Later?--Endogenous Timing of Threats. Theory and Decision 55, 235–256 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:THEO.0000044623.38467.7c
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:THEO.0000044623.38467.7c