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Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission

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Abstract

This article reviews some of the major economic issues faced by the FCC in thelast year. It focuses on the application of new analytic techniques at the FCC, andidentifies several areas in which further academic research would be valuable to theFCC.

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Currently serving as FCC Chief Economist

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Bykowsky, M., Levy, J., Sharkey, W. et al. Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission. Review of Industrial Organization 23, 157–174 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:REIO.0000006909.86620.69

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:REIO.0000006909.86620.69

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