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Spontaneously Evolved Social Order versus Positive Legislation in English Constitutional History

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Abstract

Medieval institutions contain an important strain of spontaneous order, especially from the pre-Christian period. A series of irregular successions after the Norman conquest made royal charters increasingly important in establishing the sovereign's legitimacy. Henry I's coronation charter (1100) formed the basis of Henry II's aggressive program of reform legislation, as well as for Magna Carta (1215). Henry II aimed at restoring the legal and political institutions of his grandfather Henry I after a period of civil strife and social degeneration. The fact that almost all later charters grew out of Henry I's charter, combined with the fact that later charters expanded and refined legal and political institutions, establishes the evolution of spontaneous order in the English charters. This evolution continued throughout the middle ages as subsequent kings confirmed Magna Carta.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Computer Information Systems and Economics, Western Carolina University College of Business, Cullowhee, NC, 28723, USA

    Robert F. Mulligan

  2. Department of Economics, State University of New York at Binghamton, USA

    Robert F. Mulligan

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  1. Robert F. Mulligan
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Mulligan, R.F. Spontaneously Evolved Social Order versus Positive Legislation in English Constitutional History. The Review of Austrian Economics 17, 41–65 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:RAEC.0000011336.74494.5b

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