Abstract
In this paper we develop the analysis ofthe effects on political fragmentation onfiscal policy in a number of ways. Weanalyze three kinds of fragmentation: sizeand control, institutional and over timefragmentation. In doing so we introduce anumber of new variables that allow us tolook at this issue in a broader way. At thesame time we have tackled somemethodological problems that affectedprevious analyses, using a panel of 19 OECDcountries over 1975–1995. Overall we findrelatively poor evidence in favor of sizeand over time fragmentation, and moreevidence of institutional and controlfragmentation.
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Ricciuti, R. Political Fragmentation and Fiscal Outcomes. Public Choice 118, 365–388 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000019909.77676.85
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000019909.77676.85