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Groups, Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses

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Abstract

Olson (1982) and Putnam (1993) providesharply conflicting perspectives on theimpact of private associations on economicwell-being and social conflict. Olson(1982) emphasized their propensity to actas special interest groups that lobby forpreferential policies, imposingdisproportionate costs on the rest ofsociety. Putnam (1993) viewed membershipsin horizontal associations as a source ofgeneralized trust and social ties conduciveto governmental efficiency and economicperformance. Using cross-country data,this paper investigates the impact ofassociational memberships on generalizedtrust and economic performance, findinglittle support for Olson's view of theimpact of groups, and only mixed supportfor the Putnam perspective.

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  1. The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC, 20433, U.S.A.

    Stephen Knack

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  1. Stephen Knack
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Knack, S. Groups, Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses. Public Choice 117, 341–355 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000003736.82456.04

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000003736.82456.04

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