Abstract
Some scholars have studiedMancur Olson's legacy by investigating theeffects of his research on the socialsciences (McLean, 2000). Others havescrutinized the logical and empiricalimplications of his theories (Sandler,1992; Marsh, 1976; Chamberlin, 1974;Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1970). A thirdgroup have quietly claimed that hisgreatest work, The logic of collectiveaction, was little more than apopularization of earlier ideas (Dowding,1997; Chamberlain, 1966). This paperattempts to exonerate Olson of the latterclaim by reviewing the major contributionsto collective action theory before his timeand comparing them to The logic ofcollective action.
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Dougherty, K.L. Public Goods Theory from Eighteenth Century Political Philosophy to Twentieth Century Economics. Public Choice 117, 239–253 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000003734.55916.8d
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000003734.55916.8d