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Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem

Philosophical Studies volume 118, pages 339–371 (2004)Cite this article

Abstract

A lot of people believe that distinct objectscan occupy precisely the same place for theentire time during which they exist. Suchpeople have to provide an answer to the`grounding problem' – they have to explain howsuch things, alike in so many ways, nonethelessmanage to fall under different sortals, or havedifferent modal properties. I argue in detailthat they cannot say that there is anything invirtue of which spatio-temporally coincidentthings have those properties. However, I alsoargue that this may not be as bad as it looks,and that there is a way to make sense of theclaim that such properties are primitive.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Princeton University, USA and Australian National University E-mail

    Karen Bennett

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  1. Karen Bennett
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Bennett, K. Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem. Philosophical Studies 118, 339–371 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000026471.20355.54

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000026471.20355.54

Keywords

  • Modal Property
  • Grounding Problem