Philosophical Studies

, Volume 118, Issue 1–2, pp 83–131 | Cite as

Reference, Contingency, and the Two-Dimensional Framework

  • Martin Davies

Abstract

I review and reconsider some of the themes of ‘Two notions of necessity’ (Daviesand Humberstone, 1980) and attempt to reach a deeper understanding and appreciation of Gareth Evans's reflections (in ‘Reference and contingency’, 1979) on both modality and reference. My aim is to plot the relationships between the notions of necessity that Humberstone and I characterised in terms of operators in two-dimensional modal logic, the notions of superficial and deep necessity that Evans himself described, and the epistemic notion of a priority.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Davies
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy Program, Research School of Social SciencesAustralian National UniversityCanberraAustralia

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