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Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences volume 2, pages 353–393 (2003)Cite this article

Abstract

A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of “phenomenal opacity” and “phenomenal transparency” are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-representational content, and that their relevance in understanding reflexive, i.e., cognitive subjectivity may have been overlooked in the past.

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  1. Philosophisches Seminar, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, 55099, Mainz, Germany E-mail

    Thomas Metzinger

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Metzinger, T. Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2, 353–393 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007366.42918.eb

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007366.42918.eb

  • consciousness
  • epistemic transparency
  • phenomenal transparency
  • representation
  • self-consciousness
  • self-model