Abstract
In his paper, “The Relevance of Rawls’ Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients” (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002):45–53), Giovanni Maio has developed athought-provoking argument for the permissibility of non-therapeutic research on cognitively impaired patients. Maio argues that his conclusion follows from the acceptance of John Rawls’s principles of justice, specifically, Rawls’s “liberty principle” Maio has misinterpreted Rawls’s “libertyprinciple” – correctly interpreted it does notsupport non-therapeutic research on cognitivelyimpaired patients. Three other ‘Rawlsian’ arguments are suggested by Maio’s discussion –two “self-respect” arguments and a “presumed consent” argument – but none of them are convincing. However, an alternative argument developed from Rawls’s discussion of “justice in health care” in his most recent book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, may justify certain kinds of non-therapeutic research on some cognitively impaired patients in special circumstances. We should not expect anything more permissive from a liberal theory of justice.
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REFERENCES
Maio, Giovanni. “The Relevance of Rawls' Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients.” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002): 45–53.
Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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Bell, D.R. Rawls and Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients: A Reply to Maio. Theor Med Bioeth 24, 381–393 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:META.0000006823.03739.e3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:META.0000006823.03739.e3