Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 33, Issue 1, pp 27–88 | Cite as

A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox

  • Michael Glanzberg


This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad hoc nor unnatural.

admissible sets infinitary logic Liar paradox truth 


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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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  • Michael Glanzberg

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