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Agreeability and Time Consistency in Linear-State Differential Games

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Abstract

The paper identifies conditions under which time consistency and agreeability, two intertemporal individual rationality concepts, can be verified in linear-state differential games. An illustrative example drawn from environmental economics is provided.

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Jørgensen, S., Martín-Herrán, G. & Zaccour, G. Agreeability and Time Consistency in Linear-State Differential Games. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 119, 49–63 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOTA.0000005040.78280.a6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOTA.0000005040.78280.a6

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