Abstract
The paper presents a model of toll imposition on road networks, with the aim of recovering, at least in part, the road costs. This model supposes that the amount of the toll is the result of negotiations between the public agency, which is in charge of the network management, and tends to maximize the toll revenues, and the local communities, who bear the negative consequences of the toll imposition, and are compensated for the damage they sustain. A method of negotiation management is proposed, which compels both parties to behave correctly. The model leads to a three-level hierarchical optimization problem for which a method of solution is proposed and, by way of example, applied to study case.
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Ferrari, P. A Three-Level Mathematical Programming Model of Road Pricing. Journal of Global Optimization 28, 297–304 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOGO.0000026450.28155.95
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOGO.0000026450.28155.95