Abstract
This paper describes two empirical studies of interpersonal understanding in negotiations. In the first study, the accuracy of post-negotiation estimates of the other negotiator's payoff was assessed after a role-playing simulation. Only a minority of participants exhibited evidence of the fixed pie bias, in which negotiators view all negotiations as distributive, fixed-sum situations. Participants' estimates of the other negotiator's payoff were generally better fit by the equal payoffs model, which presumes that participants believe the other negotiator's payoff is the same as one's own. This held true for both distributive task structures in which the fixed-pie view is descriptively appropriate and integrative negotiation task structures in which the fixed-pied view is inaccurate. The results did not support the hypothesis that superior understanding about the other negotiator's interests helps negotiators to achieve better outcomes for themselves; the correlation between predictive accuracy and the value of participants' own payoffs was generally low.
A second study was conducted to test the hypothesis that negotiators typically see negotiations as fundamentally a distributive, fixed pie problem, but believe their own negotiated agreements yield roughly equal payoffs to both negotiators. The results supported this hypothesis. In this second study, participants estimated the other negotiator's payoffs over a sample of hypothetical contracts. The payoff schedule estimation procedure, which has been widely used in previous research, was not used in the present research because it was shown to have serious methodological, conceptual, and procedural problems in the context of the present study.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bazerman, M. H. (1983). “Negotiator Judgment: A Critical Look at the Rationality Assumption,” American Behavioral Scientist 27, 211–228.
Bazerman, M. H. and J. S. Carroll. (1987). “Negotiator Cognition,” Research in Organization Behavior 9, 247–288.
Bazerman, M. H., T. Magliozzi, and M. A. Neale. (1985). “Integrative Bargaining in a Competitive Market,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 34, 294–313.
Bazerman, M. H. and M. A. Neale. (1983). “Heuristics in Negotiation: Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution,” in M. H. Bazerman and R. J. Lewicki (eds.), Negotiating in Organizations. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Brehmer, B. (1976). “Social Judgment Theory and the Analysis of Interpersonal Conflict,” Psychological Bulletin 83, 985–1003.
Darling, T. A. and J. L. Mumpower. (1992). “Simulating Process and Outcome for Two-Party Contract Negotiations,” Control and Cybernetics 21, 1–34.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1962). “Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponent's Utility Function,” Conflict Resolution 6, 29–38.
Lax, D. A. and J. K. Sebenius. (1986). The Manager as Negotiator. New York: Free Press.
Mumpower, J. L. (1991). “The Judgment Policies of Negotiators and the Structure of Negotiations,” Management Science 37, 1304–1324.
Mumpower, J. L. (2001). “Brunswikian Research on Social Perception, Interpersonal Learning, and Negotiation,” in K. R. Hammond and T. R. Stewart (eds.), The Essential Brunswik. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mumpower, J. L. and J. Rohrbaugh. (1996). “Negotiation and Design: Supporting Resource Allocation Decisions through Analytical Mediation,” Group Decision and Negotiation 5, 385–410.
Neale, M. A., V. L. Huber, and G. B. Northcraft. (1987). “The Framing of Negotiations: Contextual Versus Task Frames,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39, 228–241.
Neale, M. A. and G. B. Northcraft. (1986). “Experts, Amateurs, and Refrigerators: Comparing Expert and Amateur Negotiators in a Novel Task,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 38, 305–317.
Pruitt, D. G. and J. Z. Rubin. (1986). Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. New York: Random House.
Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University Press.
Thompson, L. and T. de Harpport. (1994). “Social Judgment, Feedback, and Interpersonal Learning in Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Performance 58, 327–345.
Thompson, L. and R. Hastie. (1990a). “Judgment Tasks and Biases in Negotiation,” Research on Negotiation in Organization 2, 31–54.
Thompson, L. and R. Hastie. (1990b). “Social Perception in Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Performance 47, 98–123.
Walton, R. E. and R. B. McKersie. (1965). A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiation. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Mumpower, J.L., Sheffield, J., Darling, T.A. et al. The Accuracy of Post-Negotiation Estimates of the Other Negotiator's Payoff. Group Decision and Negotiation 13, 259–290 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:GRUP.0000031089.91654.26
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:GRUP.0000031089.91654.26