Abstract
Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the reactions of certain classes of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that such theories are flawed: they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty. That is, they are unable to provide a suitable reason for anyone to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various approvals, and various individuals, and that moral response-dependent theories can accommodate the motive of duty.
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Kawall, J. Moral Response-dependence, Ideal Observers, and the Motive of Duty: Responding to Zangwill. Erkenntnis 60, 357–369 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023392.52929.68
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023392.52929.68