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The Price of Innocent Millianism

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Abstract

According to the view I call `innocent Millianism', that-clauses differing only for occurrences of co-referential names provide the same contribution to the intensional profile of a belief report. It is widely believed by friends and foes of innocent Millianism alike that this approach entails either the denial of what I label a `naïve' account ofbelief reports, or a dismissive attitude towards our semantic intuitions. In this essay, I counter that the conjunction of innocent Millianism and the naïve view of belief reports is compatible with our intuitions of truth-conditions. In order to defend this conclusion, I defend an independently motivated approach, in which utterances endowed of the same intension may nevertheless differ in truth-conditions.

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  1. Stefano Predelli
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Predelli, S. The Price of Innocent Millianism. Erkenntnis 60, 335–356 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023386.35553.4f

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023386.35553.4f

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